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A TURBULENT ADOLESCENCE AHEAD:  
THE ICC’S INSISTENCE ON DISCLOSURE  
IN THE LUBANGA TRIAL 
CHRISTODOULOS KAOUTZANIS∗ 
ABSTRACT 
The completion of the first trial at the International Criminal Court 
(ICC) against Thomas Lubanga Dyilo was a great milestone for 
international criminal justice. Despite this obvious accomplishment, this 
article argues that the Trial Chamber’s solutions to two evidentiary 
problems will restrict the ICC’s potential to effectively hear future cases. 
First, this article presents the details behind the two evidentiary problems 
of disclosure: that of exculpatory confidential information and that of the 
identities of the prosecutor’s intermediaries. This analysis is exhaustive in 
order to highlight the challenges that the Prosecutor faced and the manner 
in which the ICC Chambers responded. The article then demonstrates how 
the Chamber’s focus on the fairness of the Lubanga trial has undermined 
the ICC’s greater goal of ending impunity and achieving accountability 
for international criminal acts. This article seeks to highlight two areas of 
concern for the ICC’s future as an international court which, if left 
unaddressed, may harm international justice disproportionately more than 
the benefits conferred upon it by the Lubanga case. 
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INTRODUCTION 
The year of 2012 should be viewed as a transitional time for 
international criminal law. If Nuremberg and Tokyo represented the 
embryonic stage of the field of international criminal justice and the ad 
hoc tribunals its youth, the advent of the International Criminal Court 
(“ICC”) should signal the adolescence of the field. Similar to a healthy and 
eager teenager, international criminal justice is currently able and excited 
to stand on its two feet. 
This exciting transition is certainly deserved. The last two fugitives of 
the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (“ICTY”) 
are in The Hague, with Radovan Karadžić on trial and Radko Mladić 
scheduled to start trial soon. At the Special Court for Sierra Leone 
(“SCSL”), the last defendant, Charles Taylor, was recently convicted and 
sentenced to fifty years in prison. In the Extraordinary Chambers in the 
Courts of Cambodia (“ECCC”), the trial of Case File 002 is proceeding, as 
is the quest to appoint a third International Co-Investigative Judge, with 
the hope that the investigation of Case Files 003 and 004 will also go 
forth. Finally, the ICC reached a judgment in its first case, stemming from 
the situation in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (“DRC”), against 
Thomas Lubanga Dyilo. Many hope that while the flame of the ad hoc 
tribunals is dying, their lessons and goals have been effectively 
transplanted to the ICC. Now, ten years after the ICC’s formation, it has 
become clear that the ICC can function and that international criminal 
justice can become a permanent, respected field of law. 
Yet, despite these undisputed success stories, those in the international 
criminal justice field are warranted in asking if the future will look equally 
as bright. Like all teenagers, the field of international criminal justice also 
seems to be faced with some existential doubts. The main issue of concern 
revolves around the shape that the field is likely to adopt in the future. Or, 
in other words, can the ICC fill the shoes of the ad hoc tribunals that it is 
replacing? If yes, what will it take for this to happen? 
While these are complicated questions, this article looks at the 
evidentiary issues of the Lubanga trial and predicts that the ICC’s current 
stance on two issues of disclosure will create future practical problems for 
the Court. During the six years in which the Lubanga case moved from 
indictment to conviction, evidentiary issues plagued the proceedings. In its 
effort to guarantee the right of the accused to a fair trial—which includes 
the right to receive exculpatory evidence—the Court in 2008 and 2010 
ordered a stay of the proceedings and the provisional release of the 
accused. Through its insistence on disclosure of relevant evidence to the 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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defense, the Court was able to ensure a fair trial. This article, however, 
demonstrates how the Court’s decisions have also come at a certain 
expense and predicts that these two evidentiary decisions will likely 
contribute to a turbulent adolescence for the field of international criminal 
justice. 
Like all national and international criminal courts, the ICC has to strike 
a balance between a fair trial for the accused and the need to conduct 
investigations. For the ICC this balance is complicated by the fact that, 
thus far, all of the Court’s investigations have taken place in developing 
countries rife with conflict. In the Lubanga trial, the ICC Chambers 
prioritized fairness over flexibility on two separate occasions. First, the 
Chambers stopped the Office of the Prosecutor (“OTP”) from sua sponte 
determining how to disclose exculpatory confidential information and 
insisted that the judges, not the OTP, undertake such a determination. 
Second, the Chambers held that the OTP must reveal the identities of 
intermediaries that may have influenced its witnesses.  
This article has two larger goals. First, it aims to portray the events 
surrounding the two issues of disclosure in a comprehensive manner, one 
that integrates various ICC decisions and critically examines the more 
subtle themes present in each decision. Such a comprehensive analysis 
provides a much more thorough picture than previous fragmented 
attempts.1 Second, this article argues that the insistence on fairness may 
adversely affect the OTP’s power to investigate future atrocity cases. It 
contends that the ICC Chamber’s decision on the disclosure of exculpatory 
confidential information has damaged the OTP’s flexibility to investigate 
and prosecute future atrocities. It also contends that the Chamber’s 
decisions on disclosure of the identity of intermediaries can have a chilling 
effect on the OTP’s investigative work. As a result, this article predicts 
that the ICC will experience practical difficulties in the years to come. 
This article proceeds in five parts. Part I presents a brief description of 
the two disclosure issues that plagued that Lubanga trial. Part II provides 
an analysis of how the Court dealt with the issue of disclosure of 
 
 
 1. For some analyses of these issues before the Final Judgment, see Sabine Swoboda, The ICC 
Disclosure Regime—A Defence Perspective, 19 CRIM. L. F. 449, 450 (2008); Kai Ambos, Confidential 
Investigations (Article 54(3)(E) ICC Statute) vs. Disclosure Obligations: The Lubanga Case and 
National Law, 12 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 543, 547 (2009); Bernard Kuschnik, International Criminal Due 
Process in the Making: New Tendencies in the Law of Non-Disclosure in the Proceedings Before the 
ICC, 9 INT’L CRIM. L. REV. 157, 185 (2009); Victor Tsilonis, Thomas Lubanga Dyilo: the Chronicle 
of a Trial Foretold?, 5 INTELLECTUM 27 (2008), available at http://www.intellectum.org/articles/ 
issues/intellectum5/en/ITL05p027042_Thomas_Lubanga_Dyilo_The%20Chronicle_of_a_Case_Foret
old_Victor_Tsilonis_SLSA2009.pdf. 
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exculpatory evidence, and Part III shows the Court’s decision on the issue 
of intermediaries. Part IV then outlines how the Court’s decisions have 
affected the balance between prosecuting a case and having a fair trial. 
Finally, Part V concludes the article by highlighting the potential of a new, 
more restrained role for the ICC than the one held by previous ad hoc 
tribunals. 
I. BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF DISCLOSURE ISSUES IN THE LUBANGA CASE 
The OTP of the ICC has jurisdiction to investigate the commission of 
atrocities in three separate instances.2 The jurisdictional power most 
pertinent to this article is that the ICC can investigate when atrocities are 
committed in the territory of a state party to the Rome Statute, and the 
state party has referred the investigation of these atrocities to the OTP.3 
When a referral is issued, the OTP first opens the investigation of a 
Situation,4 through which it investigates all the atrocities alleged in the 
referral. In the second stage, the OTP brings forth criminal prosecutions 
against particular individuals who allegedly participated in the atrocities of 
the Situation. 
The Democratic Republic of the Congo (“DRC”) was one of the first 
signatories of the Rome Statute, signing on April 11, 2002. It has been a 
member of the ICC since its first day of existence—July 1, 2002. On April 
19, 2004, the ICC OTP announced that the President of the DRC had, 
through a referral, asked it to investigate alleged atrocities committed in 
the DRC territory.5 Soon thereafter, on June 23, 2004, the OTP announced 
its decision to open investigations into the DRC Situation.6 It is now 
known that the OTP had been observing the Situation in the DRC province 
 
 
 2. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court art. 13, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 3 
[hereinafter Rome Statute] (clarifying that the ICC has jurisdiction over (i) cases referred to it by a 
State Party, (ii) referrals by the UN Security Council, and (iii) sua sponte investigations of the 
PROSECUTOR in accordance to article 15). 
 3. Id. art. 14. 
 4. For purposes of clarity, the word “situation” will be capitalized when referring to a Situation 
under ICC investigation. 
 5. Press Release, Office of the Prosecutor, Int’l Crim. Ct. [ICC], OTP Receives Referral of the 
Situation in the Democratic Republic of Congo (Apr. 19, 2004), http://www.icc-cpi.int/EN_Menus/icc/ 
situations%20and%20cases/situations/situation%20icc%200104/press%20releases/pages/prosecutor%
20receives%20referral%20of%20the%20situation%20in%20the%20democratic%20republic%20of%2
0congo.aspx. 
 6. Press Release, Office of the Prosecutor, ICC, The Office of the Prosecutor of the 
International Criminal Court Opens its First Investigation (June 23, 2004), http://www.icc-cpi.int/ 
en_menus/icc/structure%20of%20the%20court/office%20of%20the%20prosecutor/reports%20and%2
0statements/press%20releases/press%20releases%202004/Pages/prosecutor%20of%20the%20internat 
ional%20criminal%20court%20opens%20an%20investigation%20into%20nothern%20uganda.aspx.  
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of Ituri since 2003—where the alleged criminal acts perpetrated by 
Lubanga took place.7 
The case against Thomas Lubanga Dyilo stemmed from the OTP’s 
investigation of the Situation in the DRC. It was the first case before the 
ICC, and the accused was in ICC custody since 2006.8 During trial, the 
OTP accused Lubanga of the single crime of enlisting child soldiers in the 
creation and operation of his militia.9 In order to prove its case, the OTP 
had to collect information and present evidence to the ICC’s Trial 
Chamber. It is now known that the OTP in this case collected evidence 
from various organizations on the ground in the DRC and also used local 
intermediaries to find witnesses against Lubanga.10 These two 
prosecutorial strategies shaped the evidentiary issues of the present case, 
and problems with that evidence began to appear even before the trial 
commenced.  
II. DISCLOSURE OF EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE 
Disclosure of exculpatory evidence was a contentious issue in the 
Lubanga trial. This section presents the ambiguity in the ICC law 
surrounding the disclosure of confidential information. It then outlines the 
facts behind the Lubanga decision and details the disclosure solution that 
was imposed by the ICC Chambers. Finally, through the example of the 
UN, this section demonstrates how the judicial decisions affected the 
OTP’s work in this case. 
A. The Legal Ambiguity 
A textual interpretation of the ICC Statute and Rules on the issues of 
confidential information and disclosure to the defense leaves many issues 
unresolved;11 notably, the rules fail to answer which obligation—
 
 
 7. Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06OA 12, Judgment on the 
Appeal against the decision of Trial Chamber I entitled “Decision on the consequences of non-
disclosure of exculpatory materials covered by Article 54(3)(e) agreements and the application to stay 
the prosecution of the accused, together with certain other issues raised at the Status Conference on 10 
June 2008” (Oct. 21, 2008), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc578371.pdf. 
 8. See Timeline of the Case, ICC, http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/situations%20and%20 
cases/situations/situation%20icc%200104/related%20cases/icc%200104%200106/Pages/democratic%
20republic%20of%20the%20congo.aspx (last visited June 18, 2013). 
 9. Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-803-tEN, Decision on the 
Confirmation of Charges, ¶ 404 (Jan. 27, 2007). 
 10. Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-2842, Judgment pursuant 
to article 74 of the Statute, ¶¶ 178–484 (Mar. 14, 2012) [hereinafter Final Judgment]. 
 11. Swoboda, supra note 1, at 450. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol12/iss2/6
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confidentiality or disclosure—is more important for the OTP. Instead, 
there is a clear mismatch between Rules 54(3) and 67(2).12 Given this 
ambiguity, it is useful both to examine how other domestic and 
international courts deal with such conflicting obligations and to expose 
existing trends.  
1. Textual Ambiguity at the ICC 
The use of confidential information by the OTP may clash with the 
OTP’s obligation to disclose exculpatory information to the defense. In 
order to resolve this potential clash, the Rome Statute and the ICC’s Rules 
of Procedure and Evidence govern both issues. The legal framework is not 
very clear; there are “numerous articles [that] govern time and mode of 
disclosure . . . [many of which are] open to the resolution of the court.”13  
First, various articles set out the duty of the OTP to disclose 
exculpatory information to the defense. Under Article 67(2) of the Statute, 
the OTP must disclose to the defense 
evidence in the Prosecutor’s possession or control which he or she 
believes shows or tends to show the innocence of the accused, or to 
mitigate the guilt of the accused, or which may affect the credibility 
of prosecution evidence. In case of doubt as to the application of 
this paragraph, the Court shall decide.14 
Additionally, under Rule 77, the OTP shall 
permit the defence to inspect any books, documents, photographs 
and other tangible objects in the possession or control of the 
Prosecutor, which are material to the preparation of the defence or 
are intended for use by the Prosecutor as evidence for the purposes 
of the confirmation hearing or at trial, as the case may be, or were 
obtained from or belonged to the person.15 
Second, some provisions allow the OTP to gather confidential 
information. Article 54(3)(e) of the Rome Statute instructs the OTP “not to 
disclose, at any stage of the proceedings, documents or information that 
 
 
 12. Ambos, supra note 1, at 552–55; WILLIAM SCHABAS, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE 
INTERNATIONAL CRIMINAL COURT 817, 818 (2011). 
 13. Swoboda, supra note 1, at 450. 
 14. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 67(2). 
 15. ICC, Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Rule 77 (2013) [hereinafter ICC, Rules of Procedure 
and Evidence], available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/legal%20texts%20and%20tools/offi 
cial%20journal/Documents/RulesProcedureEvidenceEng.pdf. 
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the Prosecutor obtains on the condition of confidentiality and solely for the 
purpose of generating new evidence, unless the provider of the 
information consents.”16 Rule 82 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence 
reaffirms the protection of confidentiality for the material collected under 
Article 54 of the Rome Statute.17 Finally, Rule 83 clarifies that the OTP 
must request an ex parte hearing for obtaining a ruling under Article 67(2) 
when there is uncertainty about the requirement to disclose evidence that 
“tends to show the innocence of the accused, or to mitigate the guilt of the 
accused, or which may affect the credibility of Prosecution evidence.”18 
In general, the Rome Statute and the Rules of Procedure and Evidence 
have established a detailed system for the disclosure of evidence to the 
defense. Under this system, the OTP is governed by broad disclosure 
obligations.19 It has been argued that these rules endow the Trial Chamber 
with inquisitorial features, as it has the power to make final determinations 
in cases of doubt.20 While these provisions are sufficient to deal with the 
disclosure of the intermediaries’ identity,21 they do not resolve the tension 
between the OTP’s duties of confidentiality towards its sources and its 
duty of disclosure of exculpatory evidence to the defense.22 
2. Disclosure of Exculpatory Evidence in Domestic Courts and 
International Human Rights Courts 
Disclosure to the defense has historically been a central, powerful 
precept of domestic law all throughout the world.23 In common law 
countries, disclosure to the defense is a key element of a fair trial.24 In 
these countries, when other interests clash with the defendant’s rights to 
access certain materials, the court is allowed to view the potentially 
 
 
 16. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 54(3). 
 17. Id. art. 82. 
 18. ICC, Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 15, Rules 82, 83. 
 19. Ambos, supra note 1, at 547.  
 20. Kuschnik, supra note 1, at 185. 
 21. See infra Part IV; Rome Statute, supra note 2, Article 67(2) (“affect the credibility of the 
Prosecutor’s evidence”). 
 22. SCHABAS, supra note 12. 
 23. For example, in the United States, the prosecutor’s duty to disclose derives, among others, 
from Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963) (holding that the State has a duty to disclose evidence 
known to a prosecutor that is favorable to a defendant’s case and material to his guilt or innocence); 
Ambos, supra note 1, at 556–66.  
 24. Ambos, supra note 1, at 556–66. 
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exculpatory material in camera and to decide on the necessity of 
disclosing the information to the defense.25 
In civil law jurisdictions, disclosure to the defense is accomplished by 
allowing access to the dossier of the case, which includes all information 
that the Investigative Judge considers useful for the case—both 
exculpatory and incriminating information.26 In this process, the 
Investigative Judge determines what evidence will be disclosed. 
For international courts, disclosure is equally important. Disclosure of 
exculpatory evidence to the defense has been enshrined in fundamental 
international legal instruments, such as the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights.27 International courts of human rights have also upheld this 
obligation. The European Court of Human Rights (“ECHR”), for example, 
held that the obligation to disclose material that may assist the accused 
stems from the principle of “equality of arms.”28 As such, a balanced trial 
in the ICC can only take place if the OTP, which is institutionally superior 
to the accused, discloses any exculpatory information in his possession to 
the defense. 
Nevertheless, the ECHR has recognized that legitimate reasons for 
non-disclosure to the defense exist, such as the need to protect the 
fundamental rights of another individual or an important public interest.29 
In cases in which conflicting interests are present, the Court has held that 
if the OTP refuses to disclose information to the accused for a legitimate 
reason, it must provide the information to the court, which will then decide 
if the accused’s rights are violated by this prosecutorial non-disclosure.30 
3. Disclosure of Exculpatory Evidence in International Criminal 
Tribunals 
While disclosure of confidential information is a well-established 
doctrine of both domestic and international human rights courts derived 
 
 
 25. See, e.g., Pa. v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39 (1987) (holding that the defendant’s “interest (as well as 
that of the Commonwealth) in ensuring a fair trial can be protected fully by requiring that the CYS 
files be submitted only to the trial court for in camera review”). 
 26. Ambos, supra note 1, at 556–66. 
 27. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, art. 11(1), U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948); International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 
2200A (XXI), art. 14(1), U.N. DOC. A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966). 
 28. Jespers v. Belgium , App. No. 8403/78, 27 Eur. Comm’n H.R. Dec. & Rep. 61 (1981). 
 29. Chahal v. United Kingdom, 1996-V Eur. Ct. H.R. 1831. 
 30. Rowe & Davis v. United Kingdom, 2000-II Eur. Ct. H.R. 287. 
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from the principle of equality of arms during trial,31 past international 
criminal tribunals have not always upheld this doctrine. The earliest and 
most widely recognized discussions on this topic took place in the context 
of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia 
(“ICTY”), which experienced a shift in its legal position over time as 
relates to this topic.  
Initially, the ICTY considered disclosure of exculpatory information to 
the accused to be in the public interest.32 The ICTY also clarified that the 
disclosure of other information of a similar nature was not an acceptable 
practice.33 When the OTP faces a choice between the duty to disclose to 
the defense and the duty of confidentiality towards his sources, the ICTY 
held in 1994 that Rule 70 (confidential information) did “not override the 
OTP’s obligation to disclose pursuant to Rule 68.”34 As a result, the ICTY 
initially followed domestic and international jurisprudence on the issue of 
disclosure.35 
After the Kosovo war, however, the ICTY’s OTP was receiving 
information including military and intelligence information from NATO 
countries, which the provider countries insisted on withholding from both 
defense and the trial chambers.36 The defense teams nevertheless pressed 
on with requests for such disclosure, and the trial chambers of the ICTY 
agreed with these requests.37 Since such decisions risked ending the 
cooperation of NATO countries, which was central to the ICTY’s 
evidence gathering ability, on June 10, 2004, the ICTY amended its Rules 
of Procedure and Evidence to condition the disclosure of exculpatory 
information (“Rule 68”) on the confidentiality agreements (“Rule 70”).38 
 
 
 31. Gabrielle McIntrye, Equality of Arms—Defining Human Rights in the Jurisprudence of the 
International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia, 16 LEIDEN J. INT’L L. 304 (2003); 
Swoboda, supra note 1. 
 32. Prosecutor v. Brdjanin and Talic, Case No. IT-99-36-T, Public Version of the Confidential 
Decision on the Alleged Illegality of Rule 70 of 6 May 2002, § 19 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former 
Yugoslavia May 23, 2002).  
 33. Prosecutor v. Blaskic, Case No. IT-95-14-A, Judgment, § 266 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the 
Former Yugoslavia July 29, 2004). 
 34. McIntrye, supra note 31.  
 35. Id. 
 36. Id.; Prosecutor v. Milutinovic, Case No. IT-05-87-AR108bis.2, Decision on Request of the 
United States of America for Review (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia May 12, 2006) 
(granting the request by the USA and other NATO countries that they not be ordered to reveal their 
national security information). 
 37. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Brdjanin and Talic, Case No. IT-99-36-T, Public Version of the 
Confidential Decision on the Alleged Illegality of Rule 70 of 6 May 2002 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the 
Former Yugoslavia May 23, 2002). 
 38. Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia, Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Rule 68, U.N. 
Doc. IT/32/REV. 44 (Dec. 10, 2009) [hereinafter ICTY, Rules of Procedure and Evidence], available 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_globalstudies/vol12/iss2/6
  
 
 
 
 
2013] A TURBULENT ADOLESCENCE AHEAD 273 
 
 
 
 
This change in the rules safeguarded NATO’s cooperation with the ICTY 
by prioritizing confidentiality over the disclosure of exculpatory 
information. 
In its ensuing decisions, the ICTY gave preference to the interest of the 
confidentiality of the information provider, placing less priority on the 
defendant’s right to a fair trial. While most decisions on this issue are non-
public, some post-2004 decisions indicate how the ICTY gave preference 
to the confidentiality of an information provider. Slobodan Milosevic, for 
example, was reminded that Rule 70 restrictions had to be respected.39 
Additionally, under the Rule 70 limitations, Dragoljub Odjanic was not 
given evidence of NATO actions that his defense considered important to 
their case.40 
The ICTY’s rules on this point constituted a significant difference from 
domestic and international precedent—one explained by the importance of 
NATO’s role in those proceedings. Indeed, the International Criminal 
Tribunal for Rwanda (“ICTR”), the Special Court for Sierra Leone 
(“SCSL”), and the Extraordinary Chambers in the Courts of Cambodia 
(“ECCC”) prioritize the disclosure of exculpatory evidence, even when 
this clashes with other obligations.41 Despite this view, the Special 
Tribunal for Lebanon (“STL”) has adopted the ICTY’s standpoint, making 
it the second international criminal tribunal that prioritizes confidentiality 
over disclosure.42 While the STL has not yet heard any cases, its rules 
indicate that confidentiality will be prioritized in important instances.43 
On the one hand, similar to the framework of the ECHR, the STL 
framework strikes a workable compromise between confidentiality and 
disclosure. It provides that if the OTP has evidence that: “(i) may 
prejudice ongoing or future investigations, (ii) may cause grave risk to the 
security of a witness or his family, or (iii) for any other reasons may be 
contrary to the public interest or the rights of third parties,” the trial 
chamber—ex parte and in camera—will decide on the method of 
 
 
at http://www.icty.org/x/file/Legal%20Library/Rules_procedure_evidence/IT032_Rev43_en.pdf (starting 
with “Subject to the provisions of Rule 70 . . . .”). 
 39. Prosecutor v. Milosevic, Case No. IT-02-54-T, Order on the Prosecutor’s Fifth Motion for 
Variance of Prior Orders of Non-Disclosure (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia Nov. 30, 
2004). 
 40. These requests for disclosure of information by Odjanic culminated in Prosecutor v. 
Milutinovic, Case No. IT-05-87-AR108bis.2, Decision on Request of the United States of America for 
Review (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia May 12, 2006). 
 41. Lukasz Korecki, Procedural Tools for Ensuring Cooperation of States with the Special 
Tribunal for Lebanon, 7 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 927, 930 (2009). 
 42. Id. at 937–40. 
 43. Id. at 933. 
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disclosure, if any, that should be used.44 The same concept applies for 
evidence that “may affect the security interests of a State or international 
entity.”45 
On the other hand, of the STL’s Rule 118 poses significant problems 
for the defendant’s rights. Under Rule 118, the STL provides that “[w]here 
the [OTP] is in possession of information which was provided on a 
confidential basis and which affects the security interests of a State or 
international entity or an agent thereof,” the OTP will seek that the 
information provider lifts the confidentiality.46 If the information provider 
refuses to cooperate, not even the STL judges shall have access to the 
evidence.47 In such cases, a Special Counsel appointed from a list pre-
approved by the information providers shall “review the information that 
the provider has not consented to being disclosed under Rule 118(C) and 
shall review the list of counterbalancing measures proposed by the [OTP] 
under Rule 118(C).”48 While several factors may further explain why the 
creators of the STL chose not to trust its judges with confidential 
information, the present process provides protection by balancing the 
rights of the accused with the interests of the information providers 
through the partial exclusion of the STL’s judicial bodies.49 The “lack of 
meaningful judicial control” should give rise to plenty of concerns.50 
4. Overview of Law: Two Opposing Currents 
The law at the ICC does not clarify which obligation, disclosure of 
exculpatory evidence, or duty of confidentiality towards information 
providers is supreme. Looking beyond the ICC, under domestic and 
international law, a defendant has the right to obtain disclosure of 
exculpatory information held by the OTP.51 Recognizing that the OTP has 
an advantage over the defense in the gathering of evidence due to its 
institutional power,52 the principle of equality of arms compels courts to 
demand that the OTP disclose exculpatory information in its possession 
 
 
 44. Special Tribunal for Lebanon, Rules of Procedure and Evidence, Rule 116, 
STL/BD/2009/OI/Rev. 4 (Mar. 20, 2009) [hereinafter Lebanon, Rules of Procedure and Evidence], 
available at http://www.stl-tsl.org/images/RPE/RPE_EN_April_2013.pdf. 
 45. Id. Rule 117. 
 46. Id. Rule 118. 
 47. Id. 
 48. Id. Rule 119. 
 49. Korecki, supra note 41, at 940. 
 50. Id. at 941. 
 51. See supra Part II.A.2. 
 52. McIntrye, supra note 31, at 272–75. 
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regardless of the origin of that information.53 Most notably for the present 
case, when the obligation to disclose evidence contradicts other priorities 
of the judicial system, common law courts, civil law courts and 
international courts of human rights have recognized the need for and 
guaranteed judicial review.54 Exculpatory information will be withheld 
from the defense only after the approval of a judicial body. Despite 
embracing the disclosure of exculpatory evidence, the ICTY and the STL 
diverge from other judicial bodies by not requiring judicial review.55 For 
these tribunals, exculpatory evidence may in some instances be withheld 
from the defense without any judicial decision-making. The next section 
demonstrates how the law was settled by the ICC’s Chambers. 
B. The Problem 
The ICC confronted the problem of disclosing exculpatory evidence 
from the beginning of the Lubanga proceedings. In this section, the 
analysis demonstrates how this issue became a problem for the OTP of the 
ICC. 
When the Lubanga case reached the Pre-Trial Chamber (“PTC”) for a 
hearing on the confirmation of charges on January 29, 2007, the disclosure 
of exculpatory evidence was an obvious problem. According to the ICC 
Rules of Procedure and Evidence, prior to the confirmation of charges, the 
PTC must ensure that disclosure takes place.56 While the OTP is not 
required to disclose all evidence at this stage, it must prepare a “document 
containing the charges,”57 and it must disclose inculpatory and exculpatory 
evidence into two separate categories.58 The bulk of such disclosures must 
happen as soon as practicable (“bulk rule”), including during the time 
 
 
 53. McIntrye, supra note 31. 
 54. Ambos, supra note 1, at 556–66. 
 55. ICTY Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 38, Rule 70; Lebanon Rules of Procedure 
and Evidence, supra note 44, Rule 116. 
 56. ICC, Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 15, Rule 61(3). 
 57. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 61(3)(a); ICC, Rules or Procedure and Evidence, supra note 
15, Rule 121(3); Regulations of Court, ICC-BD/01-01-04, Regulation 51 (May 26, 2004). 
 58. Perhaps based on ICTY practice where Rules 66 and 68 deal with incriminatory and 
exculpatory evidence; see also Ambos, supra note 1, n.29; Prosecutor v. Karemera, Case No. ICTR-
98-44-AR73.7, Decision on Interlocutory Appeal Regarding the Role of the Prosecutor’s Electronic 
Disclosure Suite in Discharging Disclosure Obligations, ¶¶ 9–13 (June 30, 2006); Prosecutor v. 
Bradlo, Case No. IT-95-17-A, Decision on Motions for Access to Ex-Parte Portions of the Record on 
Appeal and for Disclosure of Mitigating Material, ¶ 35 (Int’l Crim. Trib. for the Former Yugoslavia 
Aug. 20, 2006).  
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prior to the confirmation hearings.59 Disclosure after the confirmation 
hearing is allowed for facts that have become known only after the 
confirmation hearing.60  
In the Lubanga case, the defense raised the issue of non-disclosure of 
confidential information with the PTC before the confirmation hearings.61 
The PTC, in an opinion subsequently quoted by the Trial Chamber, 
determined that the OTP’s practice of resorting to Article 54(3)(e) 
evidence had led to extensive trial problems, as the OTP faced difficulties 
in securing the consent of the providers.62 Nevertheless, the single judge of 
the PTC found, first, that on the basis of the evidence presented by the 
OTP, the charges against Lubanga could be confirmed.63 Second, the PTC 
Judge held that the transmission of summaries containing the exculpatory 
information identified in Article 54(3)(e) documents and the use of 
“analogous information”64 was a satisfactory substitute for actual 
disclosure at the trial stage.65  
After the confirmation of charges, the Lubanga case took a series of 
twists and turns that reveal valuable information about the ICC. First, at a 
hearing on October 1, 2007, the OTP clarified that, for purposes of 
disclosure, it was in the process of reviewing “15.000 documents adding 
up to 32.000 pages.”66 The OTP admitted that there were ongoing requests 
to various organizations to lift redactions in over 500 documents, 
amounting to about 3,080 pages.67 Second, on November 9, 2007, the Trial 
Chamber issued a decision regarding the timing and manner of disclosure 
 
 
 59. Ambos, supra note 1, at 548; Prosecutor v. Katanga & Ngudjolo Chui, Case No. ICC 01/04-
01/07, Decision on Article 54(3)(e) Documents Identifies as Potentially Exculpatory or Otherwise 
Material to the Defence’s Preparation for the Confirmation Hearing, ¶ 123 (June 20, 2008). 
 60. Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-102, Decision on the Final 
System of Disclosure and the Establishment of a Timetable, ¶¶ 121–130 (May 15, 2006). 
 61. Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Decision Requesting 
Observations concerning Article 54(3)(e) Documents Identified as Potentially Exculpatory or 
Otherwise Material for the Defence’s Preparation for the Confirmation Hearing (June 2, 2008). 
 62. Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-102, Decision Requesting 
Observations Concerning Article 54(3)(e) Documents Identified as Potentially Exculpatory of 
Otherwise Material for the Defence’s Preparation for the Confirmation Hearing, ¶¶ 9–12 (June 2, 
2008). 
 63. Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-803-tEN, Decision on the 
Confirmation of Charges (Jan. 27, 2007). 
 64. Id. ¶ 65, 77–82. 
 65. Id. 
 66. Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-T-52-ENG [1Oct2007 ET 
WT], Transcript (Oct. 1, 2007). 
 67. Id.; Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Decision on the 
consequences of non-disclosure of exculpatory materials covered by Article 54(3)(e) agreements and 
the application to stay the Prosecutor of the accused, together with certain other issues raised at the 
Status Conference on 10 June 2008, ¶ 15 (June 13, 2008). 
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and the date of trial.68 In this decision, the Trial Chamber gave the OTP a 
choice to (a) withdraw any charges where non-disclosed exculpatory 
material had a material impact on the Chamber’s determination of the guilt 
or innocence of the accused, or (b) if in doubt as to whether the material 
falls into the category of exculpatory material, to put the information 
before the Trial Chamber for its determination. With this order, disclosure 
would continue until mid-December 2007 and commencement of trial was 
set for June 23, 2008. Third, on March 6, 2008, the Trial Chamber, as a 
case management tool,69 imposed disclosure obligations on the defense. 
The Trial Chamber requested that the defense disclose its strategy so as to 
allow better coordination in disclosure of information.70 Fourth, on March 
13, 2008, the OTP admitted to collecting more than fifty percent of its 
evidence on the basis of the confidentiality rules of the ICC Statute, 
Article 54(3)(e).71 On May 6, 2008, the OTP admitted in a status 
conference that its use of the confidentiality rules was to gather 
information as quickly as possible and then use what was materially 
relevant to each case.72 
Behind this prosecutorial strategy laid the fact that the OTP was not 
permitted, because of its confidentiality agreements, to disclose certain 
pieces of evidence to the defense. Throughout the trial, the information 
providers emphasized three reasons for their lack of cooperation. First, the 
information providers needed to protect their operations on the ground.73 
Second, they needed to protect their personnel from retaliation.74 Third, 
they needed to protect the lives and security of their sources.75 For the 
information providers, the requirements of a fair trial, which include the 
concept of equality of arms from which the OTP’s obligation to disclose 
exculpatory information derives, was not of central importance.  
 
 
 68. Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-1019, Decision regarding 
the timing and manner of disclosure and the date of trial (Nov. 9, 2007). 
 69. Swoboda, supra note 1, at 458. 
 70. Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC 01/04-01/06-1210, Decision on the 
Defence request for leave to appeal the Oral Decision of redactions and disclosure of 18 January 2008, 
¶¶ 2, 11–12 (Mar. 6, 2008). 
 71. Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-T-79, Hearing Transcript 
(Mar. 13, 2008). 
 72. Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-T-86-ENG, Transcript of 
Hearing on May 2008, Trial Chamber I, at 23 II, 8–14 (May 6, 2008). 
 73. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-T-204, 
Transcript of Hearing on July 2009 (July 6, 2009) (including a discussion with UN witness that 
highlights the concerns of the UN as an information provider). 
 74. Id.; Larry D. Johnson, The Lubanga Case and Cooperation between the UN and the ICC 
Disclosure Obligation v. Confidentiality Obligation, 10 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 887, 897–901 (2012). 
 75. Johnson, supra note 74, at 897–901. 
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C. The Solution 
In light of all of the above complications, the Trial Chamber, on June 
13, 2008, imposed a stay on the proceedings.76 The trial phase had been 
scheduled to begin on June 23, 2008.77 The rationale behind this decision 
informs the present analysis. The Trial Chamber stressed that the OTP was 
not only unable to disclose exculpatory confidential information to the 
defense, but also unwilling to reveal this information to the Trial Chamber, 
thereby failing to abide by the Trial Chamber’s November 9, 2007 
decision.78 As a result of the OTP’s actions, the defense and the Trial 
Chamber lacked complete knowledge of the nature of the information. 
With the exception of the U.N., whose presence had been revealed by the 
OTP, they did not even know who the information providers were.79 The 
Trial Chamber held that “the trial process has been ruptured to such a 
degree that it is now impossible to piece together the constituent elements 
of a fair trial.”80 
The Trial Chamber indicated that the source of the present problems 
was Article 54(3)(e), which is to be used “solely for the purpose of 
generating new evidence.”81 The OTP, however, did not resort to using it 
exceptionally. Instead, it used Article 54(3)(e) to “obtain evidence to be 
used at trial,”82 which was “the exact opposite of the proper use of the 
provision.”83 The Trial Chamber maintained that if the OTP had properly 
used Article 54(3)(e), there would have been negligible tension between 
the OTP’s duty to disclose to the defense and its duty of confidentiality to 
 
 
 76. Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Decision on the 
consequences of non-disclosure of exculpatory materials covered by Article 54(3)(e) agreements and 
the application to stay the Prosecutor of the accused, together with certain other issues raised at the 
Status Conference on 10 June 2008, ¶ 94 (June 13, 2008). 
 77. Id. ¶ 1. 
 78. Id. ¶ 5. 
 79. This conclusion is reached by reading the totality of the relevant documents. The court’s 
ignorance of the other information providers can be verified by looking at the language used to 
describe them, vis-à-vis the open references to the UN. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga 
Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Decision on the consequences of non-disclosure of exculpatory 
materials covered by Article 54(3)(e) agreements and the application to stay the Prosecutor of the 
accused, together with certain other issues raised at the Status Conference on 10 June 2008, ¶ 40 (June 
13, 2008) (“On 7 April 2008 the prosecution informed the Chamber that whilst it was seeking consent 
from the information providers other than the UN . . . .”). 
 80. Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Decision on the 
consequences of non-disclosure of exculpatory materials covered by Article 54(3)(e) agreements and 
the application to stay the Prosecutor of the accused, together with certain other issues raised at the 
Status Conference on 10 June 2008, ¶ 93 (June 13, 2008). 
 81. Id. ¶ 71. 
 82. Id. ¶ 73. 
 83. Id. 
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its sources.84 Apart from chastising the OTP, the Trial Chamber also 
clarified the meaning of exculpatory material. Adopting a broad definition, 
it held that such material includes information which (1) shows or tends to 
show the innocence of the accused, (2) mitigates the guilt of the accused, 
or (3) may affect the credibility of OTP evidence.85 
Finally, the Trial Chambers decision included two significant 
procedural holdings. First, in contrast to the Pre-Trial Chamber’s 
determination, the Trial Chamber did not allow the OTP’s proposal to 
disclose by analogy alternative material because it “ha[d] grave 
reservations as to whether serving other, similar evidence can ever provide 
an adequate substitute for disclosing a particular piece of exculpatory 
evidence.”86 Second, the Trial Chamber strongly reiterated that in cases of 
doubt as to disclosure, the decision to evaluate the exculpatory nature of 
information and method of transmission is “not . . . for the prosecution but 
for the judges.”87 The Chamber sanctioned the OTP for its refusal to let the 
judges determine the nature of the confidential material.88 In doing so, the 
ICC aligned itself with the jurisprudence of domestic and international 
jurisdictions, which allow judges to determine the method and manner of 
disclosure of contested evidence.89 The Trial Chamber’s rebuke of the 
OTP’s practices accompanied its decision to release Lubanga.90 
Ten days after the Chamber’s decision, the OTP filed an appeal on 
three grounds.91 It contended that (1) the Trial Chamber erred in its legal 
interpretation of the nature and scope of 54(3)(e); (2) Trial Chamber erred 
in law and in fact in its characterization of the OTP’s conduct pursuant to 
Article 54(3)(e); and (3) the Trial Chamber erred in imposing an excessive 
and premature remedy in the form of an indefinite stay of proceedings.92 
While the appellate procedure was pending, the OTP requested a lift of the 
stay of the proceedings, which the Chamber rejected because many 
obstacles for proper disclosure were still in place.93 Then, on October 14, 
 
 
 84. Id. ¶ 76. 
 85. Id. ¶ 88. 
 86. Id. ¶ 60. 
 87. Id. ¶ 87. 
 88. Id. ¶¶ 87–92. 
 89. See supra Part II. 
 90. Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-1418, Decision on the 
release of Thomas Lubanga Dyilo (July 2, 2008). 
 91. Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-1446-Anxl, Prosecution’s 
Document in Support of Appeal against Decision to Stay Proceedings (July 24, 2008). 
 92. Id. 
 93. Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-1467, Redacted Version of 
“Decision on the Prosecution’s Application to Lift the Stay of Proceedings” (Sept. 3, 2008).  
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2008, the OTP withdrew its first two grounds for appeal because the 
information providers had in the meantime agreed to allow complete and 
continuous access to the TC and, if necessary, to the Appellate Chamber.94  
The scope of the disclosure was important because the information 
providers had agreed to disclose 135 documents to the defense directly and 
in a non-redacted form.95 As for the additional 93 documents, the 
information providers had agreed to make them available to the Trial 
Chamber in non-redacted form for the duration of the trial and to the 
Appellate Chamber for full appellate review.96 Perhaps most significantly, 
the OTP revealed its correspondence with the U.N., which illustrates the 
hurdles it faced to lift the U.N.’s confidentiality.97 With these new facts in 
mind, the Appellate Chamber issued its decision on October 21, 2008.98 
Even though the disclosure was obtained before the appellate decisions, 
the decisions warrant attention for two reasons. The first decision deals 
with the release of the accused and is only tangentially related to the 
present issue. In this, the Appellate Chamber clarified that though the stay 
of proceedings was implemented on the basis of a previous decision, it did 
not have to be permanent.99 On the contrary, it could be imposed 
conditionally and temporarily.100 In cases where there is neither a full 
acquittal nor a complete termination of the criminal trial, the Trial 
Chamber is not required to release the accused, but it must balance the 
circumstances.101 The Appellate Chamber thereby legitimated continued 
detention during a temporary stay of proceedings—a decision that some 
commentators have called the most problematic effect of this decision.102 
 
 
 94. Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-1479, Prosecution’s Notice 
to the Registrar of its Discontinuance, as Moot, of the First and Second Grounds of Appeal in its 
Appeal against Decision to Stay Proceedings (Oct. 14, 2008).  
 95. Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-1478, Prosecutor’s 
Application for Trial Chamber to Review all the Undisclosed Evidence Obtained from Information 
Providers (Oct. 13, 2008). 
 96. Id. 
 97. Id. 
 98. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-1486, Judgment on 
the appeal of the Prosecutor against the decision of Trial Chamber I entitled “Decision on the 
consequences of non-disclosure of exculpatory materials covered by Article 54(3)(e) agreements and 
the application to stay the prosecution of the accused, together with certain other issues raised at the 
Status Conference on 10 June 2008” (Oct., 21, 2008). 
 99. Id. ¶ 83.  
 100. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-1487, Judgment on 
the appeal of the Prosecutor against the decision of Trial Chamber I entitled “Decision on the release 
of Thomas Lubanga Dyilo,” ¶ 1 (Oct. 21, 2008). 
 101. Id. ¶ 37. 
 102. See, e.g., Michela Miraglia, Admissibility of Evidence, Standard of Proof, and Nature of the 
Decision in the ICC Confirmation of Charges in Lubanga, 6 J. INT’L CRIM. JUST. 489 (2008). 
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Judge Pikis, in a strong dissent, warned that such detention is not allowed 
because there is only the possibility of trial at an indefinite future time.103 
Second, the Appellate Chamber agreed with the Trial Chamber’s 
reading of Article 54(3)(e).104 It concurred in the TC’s reading that Article 
54(3) was “limited to generation of new evidence.”105 It also clarified 
that—in its own insistence on using article 54(3)(e) for the generation of 
new evidence—the Appellate Chamber had not created a distinction 
between lead and other evidence.106 Finally, the Appellate Chamber held 
that the OTP has to abide by its other obligations, including disclosure of 
exculpatory information, which would trump the confidentiality 
assurances that have been given to generate new evidence.107 
While the Appellate Chamber held that the OTP must disclose 
exculpatory information and that the Trial Chamber can impose a 
conditional stay of the proceedings, it also cautioned the Trial Chamber to 
evaluate the developments that had occurred since the stay was 
imposed.108 Undoubtedly, the Appellate Chamber was referring to the 
OTP’s October 14, 2008 submissions, according to which the information 
providers had agreed to full disclosure.109 Heeding the Appellate 
Chamber’s advice, the Trial Chamber, in a November 18, 2008 status 
conference, issued an oral decision lifting the stay of the proceedings.110 In 
this decision, it specified exactly what previously held confidential 
information and in what form would be handed over to the defense.111 
The Trial Chamber’s oral decision was followed by a written decision 
on January 23, 2009 that documented not only the OTP’s compliance with 
the order to turn over all confidential exculpatory information to the 
judges, but also the methods through which the judges determined what 
 
 
 103. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-1487, Judgment on 
the appeal of the Prosecutor against the decision of Trial Chamber I entitled “Decision on the release 
of Thomas Lubanga Dyilo,” ¶ 13 (Oct. 21, 2008) (Pikis, J., dissenting). 
 104. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-1486, Judgment on 
the appeal of the Prosecutor against the decision of Trial Chamber I entitled “Decision on the 
consequences of non-disclosure of exculpatory materials covered by Article 54(3)(e) agreements and 
the application to stay the prosecution of the accused, together with certain other issues raised at the 
Status Conference on 10 June 2008” (Oct. 21, 2008). 
 105. Id. ¶ 41.  
 106. Id. ¶ 54. 
 107. Id. ¶ 2. 
 108. Id. ¶ 85. 
 109.  Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-1479, Prosecution’s 
Notice to the Registrar of its Discontinuance, as Moot, of the First and Second Grounds of Appeal in 
its Appeal against Decision to Stay Proceedings (Oct. 14, 2008). 
 110. Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-1644, Reasons for the Oral 
Decision Lifting the Stay of Proceedings, ¶ 29 (Jan. 23, 2009). 
 111. Id. ¶¶ 21–28. 
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pieces of evidence would be redacted or withheld from the defense.112 In 
this decision, the Trial Chamber clarified that “if in the result material was 
not disclosed to the defence, the Chamber then determined whether and, if 
so which, counter-balancing measures can be taken to ensure that the 
rights of the accused are protected and that the trial is fair, notwithstanding 
the nondisclosure of the information.”113  
The Trial Chamber further upheld the use of protective measures to 
balance the accused’s right of access to exculpatory evidence with the 
real-world priorities of the information providers in the final trial 
judgment. There, the Trial Chamber clarified that some pieces of 
exculpatory evidence were not fully disclosed to the accused in order to 
protect the personal safety and the safety of the families of those 
individuals named in the various pieces of evidence.114 In cases where 
disclosure was incomplete, the Trial Chamber ordering “the disclosure of 
alternative evidence or summaries” prevented unfairness to the accused.115 
Overall, the Chamber held that “in each instance, any problems that have 
arisen have been addressed in a manner which has ensured the accused has 
received a fair trial.”116 
Overall, when comparing the stances of the OTP in June 2008 and 
October 2008, it is clear that either the OTP or the information providers 
made a “strategic turnabout.”117 Under the pressure of a likely release of 
the accused, “within two weeks . . . the Prosecutor was able to offer the 
Chamber all the relevant confidential documents in unredacted form for an 
ex parte and in camera review.”118 In what appears to be a real triumph for 
the protection of the rights of the accused, the ICC in the Lubanga trial 
aligned itself with international norms and distinguished its practice from 
that of the ICTY and the STL. For international criminal law in general, 
the insistence of defendant rights over OTP’s duties to third parties seems 
a legitimating move. The decisions of the Trial and Appellate Chambers 
nonetheless leave some important issues unresolved. Part IV will examine 
these issues. 
 
 
 112. Id. ¶¶ 35–58. 
 113. Id. ¶ 46. 
 114. Final Judgment, ¶¶ 116–18. 
 115. Id. ¶ 121. 
 116. Id. ¶ 123. 
 117. Tsilonis, supra note 1. 
 118. Swoboda, supra note 1, at 470. 
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D. The Example of Evidence Obtained from the UN 
The events described above are illustrated through the relationship of 
the OTP with the UN. For the purpose of its investigations, the OTP 
approached various organizations with a presence in the DRC.119 While we 
currently know that the OTP has had contact with at least seven such 
organizations, the only organization whose details have been made public 
is the UN.120 Due to this limitation, it is impossible to grasp fully the 
parameters of the OTP’s cooperation with the other six organizations. 
Regardless, the OTP’s agreement with the UN and its subsequent 
modification illustrates the evidentiary problems faced by the OTP. 
On October 4, 2004, the UN and the ICC signed the UN-ICC 
Relationship Agreement.121 Article 18(3) states: 
[T]he United Nations and the OTP may agree that the United 
Nations provide documents or information to the OTP on the 
condition of confidentiality and solely for the purpose of generating 
new evidence and that such documents shall not be disclosed to 
other organs of the Court or third parties, at any stage of the 
proceedings or thereafter, without the consent of the United 
Nations.122 
In an extension of this agreement, promulgated because ICC personnel 
in the DRC needed support from the UN operations on the ground, the 
ICC concluded a Memorandum of Understanding with the United Nations 
Organization Mission in the DRC (“MONUC”) on November 8, 2005.123 
Relevant for the present analysis, article 10 of this MONUC, concluded on 
the basis of article 18(3) of the Relationship Agreement,124 establishes the 
 
 
 119. See, e.g., Final Judgment, ¶ 167. 
 120. Throughout the trial there is ample evidence that the OTP cooperated with the UN and equal 
evidence as to the existence of other unnamed NGOs with which the OTP cooperated. See, e.g., 
Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-1467, Redacted Version of 
“Decision on the Prosecution’s Application to Lift the Stay of Proceedings (Sept. 3, 2008) (“Of these, 
152 Documents were obtained by the prosecution from the United Nations, and the remainder were 
provided by six Non-Governmental Organisations (‘NGOs’)”). 
 121. Negotiated Draft Relationship Agreement, U.N.-ICC, U.N. Doc. A/58/874 (June 7, 2004), 
available at http://www.amicc.org/docs/UNGA_A_58_874.pdf. 
 122. Id. art. 18(3) (emphasis added). 
 123. Memorandum of Understanding between the United Nations and the International Criminal 
Court Concerning Cooperation between the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo (MONUC) and the International Criminal Court, ICC-01/04-01/06-1267-Anx2 
(Nov. 8, 2005), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc469628.pdf. 
 124. Id. art. 10, ¶ 10. 
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confidentiality of the information provider and sets up a procedure for 
partially or completely lifting this confidentiality.125 
With the help of these organizations, the OTP proceeded with its 
investigations until February 10, 2006, when the Pre-Trial Chamber issued 
an arrest warrant for Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, at the OTP’s request.126 In 
the time between the initiation of the investigation and the issuance of the 
arrest warrant, the OTP “could not . . . assess the exculpatory nature of 
some of the material” because it collected material “before cases had been 
selected.”127 Armed with information collected under confidentiality 
agreements, the OTP brought its case against Lubanga. 
From early on in the proceedings, the OTP tried to obtain 
confidentiality releases from the UN and the other information providers. 
For the UN, however, confidentiality was central to the safety of its staff 
in the DRC and the success of the UN operations in the DRC. The UN 
representatives feared that any information shared with the defense would 
be passed along to supporters of Lubanga in the DRC, who would in turn 
“seriously endanger the safety and security of certain individuals or 
prejudice the security and proper conduct of the Organization’s present 
and future operations.”128 The UN’s concern about the safety of its 
personnel is clearly reflected in the subsequent trial testimony of witness 
P-0046, who had held a position of authority within the UN structure in 
the DRC.129 In her testimony, witness P-0046 indicates repeatedly that the 
main concern of the UN was that information regarding the identities of 
child soldiers under UN care and of Congolese UN-staffers must not be 
leaked to the defense team.130 In brief, the UN had turned over 38 
documents to the OTP which contained exculpatory information, but 
which the UN did not want to share with the defense.131 These concerns 
 
 
 125. Id. art. 10, ¶ 8. 
 126. Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-2-tEN, Warrant of Arrest 
(Feb. 10, 2006). 
 127. Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06OA 12, Judgment on the 
Appeal against the decision of Trial Chamber I entitled “Decision on the consequences of non-
disclosure of exculpatory materials covered by Article 54(3)(e) agreements and the application to stay 
the prosecution of the accused, together with certain other issues raised at the Status Conference on 10 
June 2008,” ¶ 26 (Oct. 21, 2008). 
 128. Letter from Prosecutor to UN. ICC-01/04-01/06-1478-Anx1 (Oct. 9, 2008), available at 
http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc575485.pdf.  
 129. See, e.g., Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-T-204, 
Transcript of Hearing on July 2009 (July 6, 2009) (including a discussion with UN witness that 
highlights the concerns of the UN as an information provider). 
 130. Id.  
 131. Letter from Prosecutor to UN, supra note 128. 
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were prevalent for two documents in their entirety and thirty-six 
documents in redacted form.132 
In order to meet the ICC’s obligations, the OTP had to convince the 
UN to overcome its hesitations with regards to these documents. It did so 
by proposing that the UN give the judges of the Trial and Appellate 
Chambers access to the non-redacted version of the evidence. If the judges 
decided to reveal such information to the defense, the OTP undertook to:  
1. Seek all possible protective measures available under the Statute 
and the Rules of Procedure and Evidence; 
2. Consider the feasibility of making concessions of fact so as to 
render that information no longer relevant to the proceedings; 
3. Seek permission to amend (but not add or substitute) the charges 
so as to render the information no longer relevant to the 
proceedings; and 
4. If all these steps were to prove unsuccessful and as a last resort, 
to seek permission to withdraw the charges. 
Reassured by the extent and substance of these protective measures, the 
UN amended its agreement with the ICC in October 2008 to allow the 
above scheme to enter into force.133 
The UN’s cooperation with the OTP took a final turn in November of 
2008. Having accepted the scheme of judicial review created by the Trial 
Chamber, the UN notified the OTP that nine of its documents would need 
“further protective measures” if they were to be used at trial.134 Seven of 
these documents came from the list of thirty-eight documents previously 
discussed, while two documents were new to the trial process.135 The 
Chamber accepted the UN requests, marking the end of the UN journey 
into the ICC’s disclosure regime for the Lubanga case. 
 
 
 132. Id. 
 133. Response from UN to Prosecutor, ICC-01/04-01/06-1478-Anx2 (Oct. 10, 2008), available at 
http://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/doc/doc575486.pdf. 
 134. Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-1644, Reasons for the Oral 
Decision Lifting the Stay of Proceedings, ¶¶ 26–27 (Jan. 23, 2009). 
 135. Id.  
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E. Conclusion: The Law at Present 
The disclosure of exculpatory evidence consumed the attention of the 
ICC for more than two years. From the Pre-Trial Chamber’s initial 
decision in January of 2007 until the final decision of the Trial Chamber in 
January of 2009, the rules of disclosure of confidential exculpatory 
evidence underwent a major clarification. Now, the OTP must allow the 
Trial and Appellate Chamber judges unfettered access to all potentially 
exculpatory evidence and allow these judges to determine in what form 
such information will reach the defense. As a result, the ICC regime is 
aligned with all the major domestic and international legal systems and is 
distinguished from the criticized paradigms of the ICTY and the STL. 
Nevertheless, as the example of the UN indicates, this post-2008 modus 
operandi necessitated significant changes to the cooperation agreements 
between the OTP and its information providers. It also implicated the Trial 
Chamber judges in the review of evidentiary material, a decision of 
significant importance.  
Yet, despite the significance of these events, the final judgment in the 
Lubanga case made only passing reference to the issue. Out of 593 pages, 
only five paragraphs touch upon the issue of disclosure of exculpatory 
evidence.136 This lack of focus indicates that the core of the issue had been 
exhausted in the previous decisions documented above. It also indicates 
that the Trial Chamber judges were not in a position to deal with the 
problems highlighted in Part IV. Before turning to those, it is necessary to 
address the second issue of disclosure that the ICC faced.  
III. DISCLOSURE OF THE IDENTITY OF INTERMEDIARIES 
The disclosure of the identity of the intermediaries that the OTP used to 
find witnesses in the DRC was another very important issue for the trial of 
Lubanga. The OTP was unwilling to disclose the identity of the 
intermediaries to the defense in order to protect the life and security of the 
intermediaries and their families, but also so as to protect its own 
operations in the DRC—operations with goals that outlast the completion 
of the Lubanga trial.137 Admittedly, this evidentiary issue is far less 
complicated than the disclosure of exculpatory evidence. There, the OTP 
had to abide by the Court’s orders and also persuade the information 
 
 
 136. Final Judgment, ¶¶ 119–123. 
 137. Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-2434-Red2, Redacted 
Decision on Intermediaries (May 31, 2010). 
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providers to follow suit. Here, the OTP had no external actors to convince. 
The following events show that the disclosure of the identities of the 
intermediaries was a debate solely between the OTP and the Court, yet it 
significantly derailed the Lubanga trial. 
A. Legal Clarity 
The Rome Statute and the ICC’s Rules of Procedure and Evidence do 
not deal directly with the disclosure of the intermediaries used by the OTP. 
If, however, it becomes apparent that these intermediaries influenced the 
testimony presented in a case, the law is abundantly clear. Article 67, 
paragraph 2 of the Rome Statute requires the OTP to disclose “evidence in 
the Prosecutor’s possession or control which . . . may affect the credibility 
of prosecution evidence.”138 Since it is reasonable to assume that the work 
of interfering intermediaries may have affected the credibility of the 
OTP’s evidence, the OTP is obliged to reveal the identities of such 
intermediaries to the defense.139 Despite this legal clarity, the following 
factual realities made such revelations hard for the OTP. 
B. The Problem 
The OTP had to use intermediaries because of the realities in the 
Eastern Congo. In conducting the investigations, the OTP had to gain 
access to documents, witnesses, and former child soldiers who lived in a 
war zone.140 Associating with the OTP entailed significant risks for all 
participants who were likely to be harmed in retaliation for their 
cooperation with the investigative process.141 In these circumstances, the 
OTP resorted to the use of intermediaries.  
The OTP used two types of intermediaries. The first included 
individuals who would contact potential witnesses and arrange for them to 
meet with the investigators.142 Others were people who knew the security 
situation in a certain area, and thus provided guidance on the investigators’ 
 
 
 138. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 67(2). 
 139. Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-2465-Red, Redacted 
Decision on the “Prosecution’s Request for Non-Disclosure of Information in Transcripts of Re-
Interviews with Prosecution Witnesses,” ¶¶ 26–27 (June 7, 2010). 
 140. See, e.g., Final Judgment, ¶ 159. 
 141. Id. ¶ 156. 
 142. Id. ¶ 190. 
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possible actions.143 Often these two groups overlapped, with security 
experts providing potential witnesses and vice versa.144 
Initially, investigators were unable to make any contact with local 
witnesses without risking the safety of the witnesses and their families.145 
Additionally, in some instances investigators were near gunfights or local 
militia attacked their convoys.146 Behind all of these difficulties was the 
reality that the location of the investigations, particularly the city of Bunia 
and its surroundings, were under the control of militia groups for the 
entirety of the Lubanga investigations.147  
Finding intermediaries was not difficult. Initially, workers of various 
human rights NGOs provide relevant information to the ICC 
investigators.148 As these workers had knowledge of the local environment 
and expertise on the issue of child soldiers, their input was invaluable to 
the investigators.149 They eventually became intermediaries.150  
From the beginning of their use in the Lubanga case, intermediaries 
had a very active and central role in identifying potential witnesses and 
putting them in contact with the OTP’s investigators.151 Due to fragile 
security situations, the intermediaries arranged meetings between potential 
witnesses and the investigators in churches, “libraries, schools, deserted 
areas and rented houses.”152 
Furthermore, the intermediaries were compensated for their services. 
Initially, this compensation reflected the expenses that the intermediaries 
engaged in on behalf of the investigation.153 For example, an 
“intermediary using a motorcycle from Bunia to Mongbwalu” would get 
reimbursed on the basis of the costs that the investigators paid for 
analogous trips with MONUC.154 Later, however, it became apparent that 
“certain intermediaries were so indispensable that they had to be provided 
with some form of more appropriate compensation.”155 As a result, a 
 
 
 143. Id. ¶ 193. 
 144. Id. ¶ 194. 
 145. Final Judgment, ¶¶ 151–68. 
 146. Id. ¶ 155. 
 147. Id. ¶¶ 143, 151–55. 
 148. Id. ¶¶ 183–97. 
 149. Id. ¶ 167. 
 150. Id. (“As a result, the investigating team or some of the activists suggested the latter should 
act as intermediaries.”). 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. ¶ 162. 
 153. Id. ¶ 200 (“All the reimbursements to intermediaries were on the basis of an expense 
declaration form.”). 
 154. Id. ¶ 199. 
 155. Id. ¶ 203. 
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special contract was arranged by the OTP that officially made the 
intermediaries employees of the investigative team and spelled out their 
duties.156 Records show that such contracts started in early 2005 and 
carried through to 2010.157 
The intermediaries’ input in the preparation of the Lubanga case was 
monumental. As the Trial Chamber explained in its Decision on 
Intermediaries, the OTP used seven intermediaries to contact 
“approximately half of the witnesses it has called to give evidence against 
the accused in this trial.”158 The defense, however, found the role of 
intermediaries suspect. It claimed from early in the proceedings that 
intermediaries impacted the credibility of the witnesses by coaching them 
and influencing their stories.159 The defense thus requested that the OTP 
reveal the identities of the intermediaries so as to allow it to counter their 
influence.160  
Initially, the Trial Chamber deflected the defense’s requests for the 
disclosure of the intermediaries.161 It believed that the rights of the accused 
had not been infringed upon if the “information is sought solely for the 
purposes of developing a line of questions that are based on mere 
supposition.”162 But, as the trial continued, the use of intermediaries 
became a pressing issue. As a result, the Trial Chamber requested on 
February 3, 2010 that the OTP provide “comprehensive information” on 
the contacts that any of its intermediaries had with any of its witnesses.163 
By February 10, the Trial Chamber had heard evidence that placed exactly 
in front of it the issue of intermediaries; trial witnesses expressly stated 
that certain intermediaries influenced their testimonies.164 As a result, on 
February 10, the Trial Chamber called upon the OTP to undertake four 
measures that asked “whether the identity of the intermediaries should 
remain confidential in light of the recent allegations and the emerging 
defence case.”165 
 
 
 156. Id. ¶ 203. 
 157. See, e.g., id. ¶ 219 (discussing Intermediary 143). 
 158. Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-2434-Red2, Redacted 
Decision on Intermediaries, ¶ 2 (May, 31 2010). 
 159. Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-2465-Red, Redacted 
Decision on the “Prosecution’s Request for Non-Disclosure of Information in Transcripts of Re-
Interviews with Prosecution Witnesses,” ¶¶ 26–27 (June 7, 2010); Final Judgment ¶ 178. 
 160. Id. ¶ 150. 
 161. Id. ¶ 17. 
 162. Id. 
 163. Id. ¶ 30. 
 164. Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-2434-Red2, Redacted 
Decision on Intermediaries, ¶¶ 26–30 (May, 31 2010). 
 165. Id. ¶ 37. 
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C. The Solution 
Before reaching a solution on these matters, a trial witness 
unexpectedly revealed the identities of intermediaries 316 and 321 during 
the oral proceedings.166 Noting that ascertaining the identity of all 
intermediaries had by this time become an obvious priority for a complete 
and fair defense, the Trial Chamber indicated that “the defence was 
entitled to know the names of certain intermediaries, and including that of 
intermediary 143 . . . .”167 Despite this order, the OTP stalled. First, it 
claimed that the Registrar would also have to approve this decision.168 The 
Trial Chamber summarily dismissed this contention since the decision was 
an order of the Court.169 Then, the OTP contended that revealing the 
identity of the intermediaries to the Defence would be “a dereliction of its 
duty of care towards its intermediaries and the witnesses with whom they 
deal . . . .”170 In essence, the OTP argued that its duty towards the safety of 
the intermediaries trumped its duty to follow the TC’s order. As a result, 
the OTP proposed a three-stage approach: 
First, that an “appropriate” representative of the [OTP] gives 
evidence about the use of intermediaries. Second, if, following that 
evidence, the Chamber determines that it remains necessary for one 
or more of the intermediaries to be called, this should be during an 
in camera hearing at which neither party is present. Third, only as a 
final measure should the Chamber consider revealing the role of 
intermediaries.171 
The Trial Chamber rejected this proposal.172 Holding that there was 
extensive and clear evidence on the basis of which the defense should have 
access to the identity of the intermediaries, it was “not persuaded that 
these applications can be satisfactorily resolved by the [OTP’s] ‘three-
stage approach.’”173 The Trial Chamber was particularly unconvinced that 
an in camera, ex parte proceeding would guarantee the rights of the 
accused, as this was “a highly contentious and potentially important 
 
 
 166. Id. (explaining that for intermediary 316, this happened as early as June 16, 2009, by P-
0015). 
 167. Id. ¶ 41. 
 168. Id. ¶ 42. 
 169. Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-2434-Red2, Redacted 
Decision on Intermediaries, ¶ 42 (May, 31 2010). 
 170. Id. ¶ 58. 
 171. Id. ¶ 91. 
 172. Id. ¶ 136. 
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matter.”174 Finally, the Trial Chamber reiterated that there was 
considerable evidence indicating that the intermediaries influenced the 
witnesses, making it unfair to deny the defense the opportunity to examine 
this possibility.175 
The Trial Chamber then issued its own scheme for revealing the 
identity of the intermediaries. It held that disclosure of the identity of an 
intermediary would involve a case-by-case determination, and that the 
“threshold for disclosure is whether prima facie grounds have been 
identified for suspecting that the intermediary in question had been in 
contact with one or more witnesses whose incriminating evidence has 
been materially called into question.”176 Once this threshold was met, 
disclosure of the identity would take place after an assessment by the 
Victims and Witnesses Unit (“VWU”).177 The Trial Chamber can also call 
intermediaries to the witness stand if there “is evidence, as opposed to 
prima facie grounds to suspect, that the individual in question attempted to 
persuade one or more individuals to give false evidence.”178 In light of this 
scheme, the Chamber called for the testimony of intermediaries 316 and 
321.179 It also reiterated that the OTP had to disclose the identity of 
intermediary 143, but did not seek to have the latter testify at trial.180 On 
June 2, 2010 the Chamber also refused the OTP’s request to appeal this 
solution to the disclosure of the identity of intermediaries, as the issue did 
not “affect the fair and expeditious conduct of the proceedings.”181 
The disclosure of intermediary 143’s identity was not resolved at this 
point. On July 8, 2010 the OTP requested to change the time limit for 
disclosing the identity of 143 or to stay the proceedings pending 
consultations of the VWU.182 The OTP made this request because 
intermediary 143 had sought to renegotiate his protective measures.183 The 
Trial Chamber had an oral proceeding on July 7, 2010, and was informed 
that intermediary 143 had accepted the security arrangement offered by the 
 
 
 174. Id. ¶ 137. 
 175. Id. ¶ 138. 
 176. Id. ¶ 139.  
 177. Id. ¶ 139(d). 
 178. Id. 
 179. Id. ¶ 141. 
 180. Id. ¶ 143. 
 181. Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06, Decision on the 
Prosecutor request for leave to appeal the “Decision on Intermediaries,” ¶ 32 (June 2, 2010). 
 182. Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-2517-Red, Redacted 
Decision on the Prosecutor’s Urgent Request for Variation of the Time-Limit to Disclose the Identity 
of Intermediary 143 or Alternatively to Stay Proceedings Pending Further Consultations with the 
VWU (July 8, 2010). 
 183. Id. ¶ 6. 
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ICC, only to later renege on his acceptance. By July 6, 2010, it was 
unclear if intermediary 143 had “rejected [the security measures] outright 
or intended to require adjustments.”184 Additionally, “the Chamber was 
informed by the VWU that, inter alia, a significant financial component 
had been raised by 143.”185 
In light of these facts, the Trial Chamber ordered the OTP to disclose 
the identity of intermediary 143 “within the next half-an-hour, and 
arranged for the Court to reconvene at 14.30 for the continuation of the 
defense’s questions.”186 It also stressed that the defense would keep the 
information limited only to its counsel, assistance, and resource person in 
the DRC.187 The OTP, having failed to abide by the order, asked the 
Chamber to revisit its order that afternoon.188 The Chamber swiftly 
rejected the request, clarifying that disclosure should take place, since 
“protective measures have been offered, which are deemed by the relevant 
body of this Court to be satisfactory, and that offer has not in any way 
been withdrawn.”189 The OTP again refused to comply with this order.190 
Echoing its statements in May, the OTP asserted that it had an obligation 
to fulfill its duties under the Rome Statute, which include protection of 
witnesses and intermediaries.191 
The Trial Chamber’s response to the OTP’s stance was quick and strict. 
It clarified that the disclosure of identity of the intermediaries is relevant 
for examining the allegation that “the [OTP] has knowingly employed, or 
made use of, intermediaries who influenced individuals to give false 
testimony, thereby abusing its powers.”192 It then held that: 
The Prosecutor, by his refusal to implement the orders of the 
Chamber and in the filings set out above, has revealed that he does 
not consider that he is bound to comply with judicial decisions that 
relate to a fundamental aspect of trial proceedings, namely the 
protection of those who have been affected by their interaction with 
 
 
 184. Id.  
 185. Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-2517-Red, Redacted 
Decision on the Prosecution’s Urgent Request for Variation of the Time-Limit to Disclose the Identity 
of Intermediary 143 or Alternatively to Stay Proceedings Pending Further Consultations with the 
VWU, ¶ 6 (July 8, 2010).  
 186. Id. ¶ 11. 
 187. Id. ¶ 8. 
 188. Id. ¶ 12. 
 189. Id.  
 190. Id. ¶ 13. 
 191. Id. ¶ 13.1. 
 192. Id. ¶ 20. 
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the Court, in the sense that they have had dealings with the 
Prosecution.193  
The Trial Chamber went on to hold that it is the “only organ of the Court 
with the power to order and vary protective measures vis-à-vis individuals 
at risk on account of work of the ICC.”194 
Furthermore, the Chamber held that the OTP “cannot be allowed to 
continue with this prosecution if he seeks to reserve to himself the right to 
avoid the Court’s orders whenever he decides that they are inconsistent 
with his interpretation of his other obligations.”195 Because of the material 
non-compliance with the Chamber’s order of July 7, 2012, the Chamber 
found it “necessary to stay these proceedings as an abuse of the process of 
the Court.”196 Since a fair trial was not possible because the judges could 
not control the OTP’s actions, the Chamber halted the entire trial 
process.197 Consequently, the Trial Chamber, in a July 15, 2010 oral 
decision, decided to release the accused from detention.198 For a second 
time an issue of disclosure had brought the trial process to a grinding halt 
and had led to the provisional release of Thomas Lubanga Dyilo. 
Soon thereafter, the OTP filed three appeals stemming from the 
Chamber’s decision to release Lubanga. On July 23, 2010, the Appellate 
Chamber decided to hold Lubanga in detention until the other two 
appellate decisions were issued.199 The Appellate Chamber issued its other 
two decisions on October 8, 2010.200 
First, it agreed with the Trial Chamber’s determination that the OTP “is 
obliged to comply with the orders of the Chamber.”201 It found that the 
 
 
 193. Id. ¶ 21. 
 194. Id. ¶ 23. 
 195. Id. ¶ 28. 
 196. Id. ¶ 31. 
 197. Id. ¶ 28. 
 198. Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-T-314.ENG, Order to 
Release Mr. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo (July 15, 2010). 
 199. Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-2536, Decision on the 
Prosecutor’s request to give suspensive effect to the appeal against Trial Chamber I’s oral decision to 
release Mr. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo (July 23, 2010). 
 200. Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06 CA 18, Judgment on the 
appeal of the Prosecutor against the decision of Trial Chamber I of 8 July 2010 entitled “Decision on 
the Prosecutor’s Urgent Request for Variation of the Time-Limit to Disclose the Identity of 
Intermediary 143 or Alternatively to Stay Proceedings Pending Further Consultations with the VWU” 
(Oct. 8, 2010); Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06 0A 17, Judgment on 
the appeal of Prosecutor against the oral decision of Trial Chamber I of 15 July 2010 to release 
Thomas Lubanga Dyilo (Oct. 8, 2010). 
 201. Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06 CA 18, Judgment on the 
appeal of the Prosecutor against the decision of Trial Chamber I of 8 July 2010 entitled “Decision on 
the Prosecutor’s Urgent Request for Variation of the Time-Limit to Disclose the Identity of 
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OTP’s “willful non-compliance constituted a clear refusal to implement 
the orders of the Chamber.”202 It disagreed with the Trial Chamber, 
however, as to the proper remedy for the OTP’s violation. Instead of 
authorizing a stay of the proceeding, the Appellate Chamber held that 
“sanctions under article 71 of the Statute are the proper mechanism for a 
Trial Chamber to maintain control of proceedings when faced with the 
deliberate refusal of a party to comply with its orders.”203 Once imposed, 
these sanctions should be given reasonable time to effect compliance with 
the Trial Chamber’s orders.204 As a result, in its second decision of 
October 8, 2010, the Appellate Chamber held that the release of Lubanga 
was not warranted.205  
D. The Consequences that Disclosure had on the Lubanga Judgment  
Following the condemnation of its practices by both the Trial and 
Appellate Chambers, the OTP revealed the identity of intermediary 143.206 
During the trial, the OTP also called intermediaries 316 and 321 to the 
stand, thus putting the intermediary issue to rest for the duration of the 
trial.207 The issue, however, forcefully returned to the forefront in the Trial 
Chamber’s Final Judgment of March 14, 2010, in which it dealt with the 
substantive allegations against the involvement of intermediaries.208 
In the Final Judgment, the Trial Chamber investigated whether, as the 
defense had always claimed, the intermediaries had interfered with the 
witness statements.209 In order to reach its conclusion, the Chamber made 
two examinations. First, for those intermediaries who were called to testify 
 
 
Intermediary 143 or Alternatively to Stay Proceedings Pending Further Consultations with the VWU,” 
¶¶ 1–3 (Oct. 8, 2010). 
 202. Id. ¶ 46. 
 203. Id.  
 204. Id. ¶ 3. 
 205. Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06 0A 17, Judgment on the 
appeal of Prosecutor against the oral decision of Trial Chamber I of 15 July 2010 to release Thomas 
Lubanga Dyilo, ¶ 2 (Oct. 8, 2010). 
 206. Final Judgment ¶ 208. 
 207. Id. ¶¶ 293, 375. 
 208. Id. ¶¶ 178–484 (“VII. INTERMEDIARIES”). 
 209. Id. ¶ 178 (“The fundamental question raised by the defence under this heading is whether 
during the investigations leading to this trial, four of the intermediaries employed by the prosecution 
suborned the witnesses they dealt with, when identifying or contacting these individuals or putting 
them in touch with the investigators, while carrying their risk assessments.”); Id. ¶ 180 (“As regards 
this aspect of the case, the Chamber needs to be persuaded beyond reasonable doubt that the alleged 
former child soldiers have given an accurate account on the issues that are relevant to this trial (viz. 
whether they were below 15 at the time they were conscripted, enlisted or used to participate actively 
in hostilities and the circumstances of their alleged involvement with the UPC.”)). 
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(“P-0316 and P-0321”), the Chamber weighed the reliability of their 
statements at trial.210 For example, it noted that P-0316 was inconsistent on 
the stand, asserting that he had not claimed expenses from the OTP, only 
to be confronted with a receipt he had issued by the defense.211  
Second, for all intermediaries (“143, P-0316, P-0321, P-0031”), the 
Chamber examined the reliability of the witnesses they introduced to the 
OTP.212 Intermediary 143, for example, introduced to the OTP four 
individuals that were used as witnesses against Lubanga (“P-0007, P-0008, 
P-0010, and P-0011”).213 The Chamber examined the testimony of these 
individuals and found their reliability questionable.214 It then concluded 
that there was a “real risk that he [143] played a role in the markedly 
flawed evidence that these witnesses provided to the OTP and to the 
Court.”215 
Overall, once the identities of the intermediaries were disclosed to the 
defense, the Trial Chamber was able to conduct a fact-based analysis of 
their input into the investigative process. Through this examination, the 
Chamber held that intermediaries 143, 316, and 321 had improperly 
influenced the trial process.216 There was insufficient evidence, however, 
to indicate that intermediate P-0031 had done so as well.217 
 
 
 210. Id. ¶¶ 292–450. 
 211. Id. ¶ 294 (“[T]he defence confronted him with a receipt signed by him indicating that he had 
received $30 for transport relating to, and his communication with, three witnesses.”). 
 212. Id. ¶¶ 208–484.  
 213. Id. ¶¶ 208–221. 
 214. See, e.g., id. ¶ 291.  
Given the pattern of unreliability as regards the witnesses introduced by Intermediary 143 and 
called to give evidence during the trial (P-0007, P-0008, P-0010 and P-0011), the Chamber 
accepts that there is a real risk that he played a role in the markedly flawed evidence that 
these witnesses provided to the OTP and to the Court. Bearing in mind this consistent lack of 
credibility as regards the trial witnesses he introduced to the investigators, and particularly 
focusing on the cumulative effect of their individual accounts, it is likely that as the common 
point of contact he persuaded, encouraged or assisted some or all of them to give false 
testimony. The Chamber accepts that the accounts of P-0007, P-0008, P-0010 and P-0011 
were or may have been truthful and accurate in part, but it has real doubts as to critical 
aspects of their evidence, in particular their age at the relevant time. Although other potential 
explanations exist, the real possibility that Intermediary 143 corrupted the evidence of these 
four witnesses cannot be safely discounted. 
Id. 
 215. Id. 
 216. Id. ¶¶ 291, 373 (“Bearing in mind especially P-0316’s lack of credibility, the Chamber is of 
the view that there are strong reasons to conclude he persuaded witnesses to lie as to their involvement 
as child soldiers within the UPC.”); id. ¶ 450 (“Although the Chamber does not criticise the fact that P-
0321 assisted the prosecution and a victims’ organisation simultaneously, on the basis of the matters 
set out above the significant possibility has been established that P-0321 improperly influenced the 
testimony of a number of the witnesses called by the prosecution. Additionally, real doubt has been 
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E. Conclusion: the Law on Disclosure of the Identity of Intermediaries 
The issue of intermediaries was the most important evidentiary issue in 
the Final Judgment. The Trial Chamber demonstrated that three 
intermediaries had improperly influenced witnesses in an extensive 200-
page description. Combined with the detailed prior holdings on the issue 
of intermediaries, the ICC Chambers have sent a clear message to the 
OTP: if intermediaries are used in investigations and allegations of 
misconduct arise, their identity will be revealed to the defense. This end-
result of the disclosure process may have consequences far beyond the 
Lubanga proceedings. It is to these consequences that the next Part turns. 
IV. BALANCING ON TWO FEET: FAIRNESS OR ACCOUNTABILITY  
The introduction of this article highlighted that the ICC, like any 
criminal court, must balance the fairness of the proceedings with the 
flexibility of conducting investigations and bringing atrocity cases. The 
two goals may overlap. It would be hard to conceive of an ICC Chambers 
that prioritized fairness but remained indifferent to the concept of greater 
accountability for atrocities. Nevertheless, it is possible that measures 
taken to safeguard fairness impede the possibility of conducting future 
investigations.  
This Part attempts to analyze the impact of the Lubanga trial’s 
disclosure issues on the future of the ICC investigations. The first section 
argues that the Chamber’s decision on exculpatory confidential 
information has damaged the OTP’s flexibility in investigating and 
prosecuting future atrocity crimes. Similarly, the second section contends 
that the Chamber’s decisions on intermediaries can restrict the OTP from 
bringing future cases. 
A. Two Consequences of the Disclosure of Exculpatory Evidence  
This section argues that, for two reasons, the mandatory disclosure of 
exculpatory confidential information to the trial judges has shifted the 
attention of the court so far in the direction of ensuring a fair trial that it 
risks limiting the power of the ICC to bring future atrocity proceedings. 
First, however, it is valuable to examine an overview of the realities of 
 
 
cast over the propriety of the way in which children were selected for introduction to the 
prosecution.”). 
 217. Id. ¶ 476. 
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disclosure of confidential information and cooperation with third-party 
information providers. 
1. Putting the present facts into a greater perspective 
As outlined in Part II, the Lubanga trial has implemented a scheme of 
disclosure for confidential exculpatory evidence that is lacking in the 
Rome Statute. There are now four possible outcomes for the cases in 
which the OTP holds exculpatory evidence falling under the coverage of a 
confidentiality agreement between the OTP and the information provider. 
It is possible that the information provider lifts the confidentiality, and the 
evidence is in toto passed to the defense.218 Alternatively, the information 
provider lifts the confidentiality but the information passes to the defense 
in redacted form or in some suitable alternative (e.g., summaries). The 
ICC judges, in camera and ex parte, determine this alternative form of 
evidence.219 Third, if the information provider does not lift the 
confidentiality, the OTP must withdraw the charges or admit the 
underlying facts found in the withheld pieces of evidence.220 Finally, if the 
information provider disagrees with the protective measures imposed by 
the judicial chambers, the OTP can again refuse to disclose and instead 
withdraw the charges or admit the underlying facts found in the withheld 
pieces of evidence.221  
Before proceeding with a two-fold critique of the Chambers’ actions, it 
is important to recognize that disclosure of exculpatory evidence is an 
issue that plagues all criminal trials. In domestic and international 
jurisdictions (including the ICC), the disclosure of exculpatory evidence 
 
 
 218. This comes from the rules and the confidentiality agreements. It was also verified in The 
Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-1486, Judgment on the appeal of the 
Prosecutor against the decision of Trial Chamber I entitled “Decision on the consequences of non-
disclosure of exculpatory materials covered by Article 54(3)(e) agreements and the application to stay 
the prosecution of the accused, together with certain other issues raised at the Status Conference on 10 
June 2008,” ¶ 86 (Oct. 21, 2008). 
 219. See, e.g., The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-1486, 
Judgment on the appeal of the Prosecutor against the decision of Trial Chamber I entitled “Decision on 
the consequences of non-disclosure of exculpatory materials covered by Article 54(3)(e) agreements 
and the application to stay the prosecution of the accused, together with certain other issues raised at 
the Status Conference on 10 June 2008,” ¶¶ 45–48 (Oct. 21, 2008). 
 220. The Prosecutor v. Thomas Lubanga Dyilo, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/06-1486, Judgment on 
the appeal of the Prosecutor against the decision of Trial Chamber I entitled “Decision on the 
consequences of non-disclosure of exculpatory materials covered by Article 54(3)(e) agreements and 
the application to stay the prosecution of the accused, together with certain other issues raised at the 
Status Conference on 10 June 2008,” ¶ 28 (Oct. 21, 2008); id. ¶ 8 (Pikis, J., dissenting). 
 221. See Letter from Prosecutor to UN, ICC-01/04-01/06-1478-Anx1 (Oct. 9, 2008); Response 
from UN to Prosecutor, ICC-01/04-01/06-1478-Anx2 (Oct. 10, 2008). 
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relies disproportionately on the honesty and the cooperation of the 
prosecutor. In the United States, for example, violations of the obligation 
to disclose exculpatory evidence, known as Brady violations, have resulted 
in numerous wrongful convictions.222 The dependence of the system of 
disclosure on prosecutors can be highly problematic.223 As the dissents of 
Justices Marshall and Brennan in Bagley indicate, the system of disclosure 
of exculpatory evidence “permits prosecutors to withhold with impunity 
large amounts of undeniably favorable evidence.”224 Similarly, in the ICC, 
the solution implemented by the Chambers still depends heavily on 
prosecutors’ decision making. Only the prosecutor is in a position to 
understand that some evidence is exculpatory and to then seek to disclose 
it, instead of hiding it from all other participants at the trial. This 
dependence on the OTP remains even with the new scheme of review prior 
to disclosure. 
While the four alternative possibilities of disclosure do not change the 
fact that the disclosure regime depends on the honesty of the OTP, they 
impose two significant burdens that are likely to impede future 
investigations. Both of the following critiques rest on two assumptions. On 
the one hand, they assume that it is difficult for the information provider to 
determine what evidence may be exculpatory. As the ICC Chambers have 
recognized,225 the OTP can only make such determinations after a case is 
built, which in the Lubanga case took place years after the initial 
cooperation of the information providers. As a result, it is assumed that the 
information providers can only consider whether to provide or not to 
provide such information. They are not in a position to make strategic 
calculations by refusing to provide exculpatory information to the OTP. 
On the other hand, the following two critiques assume, with good 
reason, that the OTP is unable to fully investigate all atrocities using its 
own resources. At the present moment the OTP is tasked with 
 
 
 222. N.Y. STATE BAR ASS’N, TASK FORCE ON WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS, FINAL REPORT OF THE 
NEW YORK STATE BAR ASSOCIATION’S TASK FORCE ON WRONGFUL CONVICTIONS 21–24 (2009), 
available at http://www.nysba.org/Content/NavigationMenu42/April42009HouseofDelegatesMeeting 
AgendaItems/FinalWrongfulConvictionsReport.pdf (discussing various categories of Brady evidence). 
 223. See generally Cynthia E. Jones, A Reason to Doubt: the Suppression of Evidence and the 
Interference of Innocence, 100 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 415 (2010). 
 224. United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 700 (1985).  
 225. Prosecutor v. Katanga & Ngudjolo Chui, Case No. ICC 01/04–01/07, Decision on Article 
54(3)(e) Documents Identifies as Potentially Exculpatory or Otherwise Material to the Defence’s 
Preparation for the Confirmation Hearing (June 20, 2008). 
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investigating atrocities that occurred in seven Situations.226 It is also 
engaged in preliminary inquiries into atrocities allegedly committed in 
seven other states.227 Finally, the OTP has to bring forth the cases against 
fifteen individuals.228 With a workload that spans the globe and a 
relatively small workforce, particularly when compared to those of the ad 
hoc tribunals,229 the OTP has no option but to rely on external sources.230 
The strength of this assumption can be verified by the OTP’s own 
statements.231 In dismissing any further investigation over atrocities 
allegedly committed in Iraq by British forces, the OTP clarified that in its 
preliminary investigation it relied on “open sources . . . among others, the 
findings of Amnesty International, Human Rights Watch, Iraq Body Count 
and Spanish Brigades Against the War in Iraq.”232 It also “sought and 
received additional information from relevant States as well as from other 
entities identified with the interests of possible victims.”233  
It is additionally noteworthy that it makes perfect sense for the OTP to 
rely on other organizations for evidentiary purposes. They have significant 
capacity to assist the ICC, as the Rome Statute mandates.234 As Baylis 
illustrates, the actions of MONUC in the DRC make it a great source of 
information of atrocities.235 For example, after the Movement de 
Liberation du Congo (“MLC”) perpetrated the Effacer le Tableau (“Erase 
the Board”) attack in and around Mambasa, Ituri, MONUC’s Human 
 
 
 226. The current Situations are: Sudan, Libya, DRC, Uganda, Central African Republic, Ivory 
Coast, Kenya, Mali (available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/situations%20and%20cases/ 
situations/Pages/situations%20index.aspx). 
 227. Afghanistan, Georgia, Guinea, Colombia, Honduras, Korea, and Nigeria (available at http:// 
www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/icc/situations%20and%20cases/Pages/situations%20and%20cases.aspx at 
the bottom of the webpage). 
 228. For the latest count, see Situations and Cases, ICC, http://www.icc-cpi.int/en_menus/ 
icc/situations%20and%20cases/Pages/situations%20and%20cases.aspx (last visited Apr. 25, 2013).  
 229. See Alex Whiting, Lead Evidence and Discovery before the International Criminal Court: 
The Lubanga Case, 14 UCLA J. INT’L & FOREIGN AFF. 207, 226–230 (2009). 
 230. See Christian M. De Vos, Case Note: Prosecutor v Thomas Lubanga Dyilo ‘Someone who 
Comes between one Person and Another’: Lubanga, Local Cooperation and the Right to a Fair Trial, 
12 MELBOURNE J. INT’L L. 1 (2008) (outlining the use of intermediaries and the ICC decisions of 2010 
and claiming that intermediaries have a role in the ICC). 
 231. OTP response to communication received concerning Iraq, OFFICE OF THE PROSECUTOR 
(Feb. 9, 2006), available at http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/04D143C8-19FB-466C-AB77-
4CDB2FDEBEF7/143682/OTP_letter_to_senders_re_Iraq_9_February_2006.pdf. 
 232. Id. at 7. 
 233. Id. 
 234. Elena A. Baylis, Outsourcing Investigations, 14 UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOREIGN AFF. 121, 143 
(2009) (arguing for integration of these regional experts into the Prosecutor’s teams). 
 235. Id. at 130–38.  
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Rights Division stepped in.236 Its investigators “spent about two-and-a-half 
months total over the course of two visits investigating this attack and 
interviewing victims, witnesses, and perpetrators.”237 In doing so, 
MONUC helped preserve the evidence of rape, pillage and even 
cannibalism “for future use and produced several widely publicized 
reports.”238 Such evidence would have been useful both for the OTP and 
the defense teams in a case against members of the MLC. The 
disproportionality of available resources between the OTP and third-party 
providers becomes even more obvious when considering that the 
investigative teams of MONUC “interviewed 150 people and traveled to 
thirty towns in one 10-day probe of a single incident,” compared to the 
OTP,239 which conducted 70 missions and 200 interviews over a one-and-
a-half year period.240 Similarly, past international criminal tribunals, such 
as the ICTY and the ECCC, relied heavily on the work of third party 
information providers.241 
The combination of increased burdens on the OTP and the presence of 
third parties with significant information makes it extremely likely that the 
OTP will continue to enter into confidentiality agreements in an effort to 
cooperate with such third parties. Indeed, the ICC Chambers have also 
acknowledged that this will be the case.242 In light of this reality, the 
findings of the Lubanga trial impede the OTP in two significant ways. 
They are likely to dull the incentive of some important information 
providers to cooperate with the OTP and diminish the OTP’s capacity to 
bring an effective case. 
 
 
 236. Elena A. Baylis, Reassessing the Role of International Criminal Law: Rebuilding National 
Courts Through Transnational Networks, 50 B.C. L. REV. 1, 54–55 (2009). 
 237. Id. at 55. 
 238. Id. 
 239. Baylis, Outsourcing Investigations, supra note 234, at 142. 
 240. U.N. High Comm’r for Human Rights, MONUC Human Rights Div., Special Report: Special 
Inquiry into the Bas Congo Events of February and March 2008, at 1 (May 2008), available at 
http://www.refworld.org/publisher,MONUC,,,48624eae2,0.html; ICC, Report on the Activities 
Performed During the First Three Years (June 2003–June 2006), ¶ 14 (Sept. 12, 2006), available at 
http://www.icc-cpi.int/NR/rdonlyres/D76A5D89-FB64-47A9-9821725747378AB2/143680/OTP_3year 
report20060914_English.pdf. 
 241. The ECCC cooperated significantly with the Documentation Center of Cambodia (“DC-
Cam”). Additionally, the ICTY—when investigating the atrocities committed in Kosovo—relied on 
third parties. See, e.g., Gideon Boas, A Response to Christian De Vos by Gideon Boas, MELBOURNE J. 
INT’L L. OPINIO JURIS BLOG (Dec. 7, 2011, 7:00 AM), http://opiniojuris.org/2011/12/07/a-response-to-
christian-de-vos-by-gideon-boas/.  
 242. Prosecutor v. Katanga & Ngudjolo Chui, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07-621, Decision on 
Article 54(3)(e) Documents Identified as Potentially Exculpatory or Otherwise Material to the 
Defence’s Preparation for the Confirmation Hearing (June 20, 2008) (claiming that “cases are likely to 
reappear”). 
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2. Disclosure Scheme Impedes Many Organizations from Cooperating 
with the OTP 
Future prosecutions may be hindered because the current regime of 
disclosure increases the involvement of the judiciary, which does not 
necessarily command the trust of the information providers. 
After the Lubanga trial, information providers are aware that, if their 
confidential information containing exculpatory evidence requires 
protective measures, it will initially be handed over to trial judges without 
redaction. Under the rules set in the Lubanga case, after the judges have 
made their determination, such information will be given to the defense in 
the appropriate form, but will also remain available in its original, non-
redacted form for the Trial and Appellate Chambers’ future review. 
Additionally, since the ICC is a permanent court, any information given to 
the OTP will stay on file and may become relevant in a trial after an 
extended number of years, when the goals of the information provider and 
its rapport with the ICC may no longer be the same.243 Overall, the scheme 
of disclosure complicates the ICC’s cooperative relationship with the 
information providers. They can no longer hide behind their 
confidentiality agreements and have to work with the OTP and the 
Chambers to effectuate disclosure when necessary. For two different 
reasons, these restrictions are certain to cause problems for the OTP’s 
staff. To underscore these difficulties for the reader, this article will 
examine some of the realities faced in the ICC’s ongoing investigations. 
On the one hand, plenty of human rights NGOs with ground presence 
may hesitate to provide evidence under the current scheme of cooperation. 
At present, these NGOs can choose to disclose information and then rely 
on the redactions and other protective measures taken by ICC judges. If 
the latter make a mistaken disclosure, the NGOs will likely face negative 
operational repercussions. Alternatively, these NGOs can refuse to 
cooperate with the OTP, not disclose anything, and thus not risk 
jeopardizing their security and their operations by a possible mistaken 
decision of the ICC judges.244 It may, unfortunately, often be the case that 
the stakes for these NGOs are too high to trust their safety and operations 
in the protective measures determined by judges in The Hague. Indeed, 
 
 
 243. See Whiting, supra note 229. 
 244. Larry D. Johnson, The Lubanga Case and Cooperation between the UN and the ICC, 
Disclosure Obligation v. Confidentiality Obligation, 10 J. OF INT’L CRIM. JUST. 887, 903 (2012) 
(recommending that the UN remain vigilant in cooperating with the OTP). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
  
 
 
 
 
302 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY GLOBAL STUDIES LAW REVIEW [VOL. 12:263 
 
 
 
 
some NGOs already refused to cooperate with the OTP even before the 
advent of this disclosure regime.245 
As most ICC investigations take place in areas of ongoing conflict, 
judicial decisions have a very real potential to harm the NGO’s staff and 
operations. So far, at least one NGO has been attacked for its cooperation 
with the OTP in the investigation of atrocities in the DRC.246 Indeed, in the 
Katanga case, the OTP put forth substantiated claims that, due to actions 
of individuals in favor of the accused, “staff members of that NGO, in 
particular, [REDACTED] and their family members, have already suffered 
intimidation for several years, and were even recently victims of attacks at 
their homes [REDACTED].”247 Furthermore, it is already the case that 
many NGOs have refused to cooperate with the OTP’s investigation in 
Sudan for fear of being associated with the ICC.248 As the Sudanese 
government has suspected NGOs of collaborating with the OTP, the 
former have “gone out of their way to avoid even the appearance of 
collaboration.”249 Unfortunately, the OTP would want good collaboration 
with local NGOs in Sudan in particular, where investigating has been 
almost impossible.250 
On the other hand, the central role played by judges is very likely to 
stop any information provision by states and state organizations such as 
NATO. In ICC investigations in Libya, Sudan, and Uganda, a significant 
source of information can come from military fact-gathering missions. For 
example, similar to the Kosovo campaign, NATO intelligence units likely 
gathered information on the actions of the Qaddafi regime before and 
during the bombing campaign. The U.S. military personnel advising the 
Ugandan government on the LRA have probably collected similar 
evidence. Such evidence could be useful for trial. The member-states of 
NATO, however, have in the past been unwilling to reveal their military 
 
 
 245. Final Judgment, ¶ 163 (“Some NGOs refused to cooperate with the Court . . . .”). 
 246. Prosecutor v. Katanga & Ngudjolo Chui, Case No. ICC-01/04-01/07-888-Red-tENG, 
Grounds for the Oral Decision on the Prosecutor’s Application to Redact the Statements of Witnesses 
001, 155, 172, 280, 281, 284, 312 and 323 and the Investigator’s Note concerning Witness 176 (rule 
81 of the Rules of Procedure and Evidence), ¶ 18 (Jan. 10, 2011). 
 247. Id. 
 248. Lynsey Addario & Lydia Polgreen, Aid Groups’ Expulsion, Fears of More Misery, N.Y. 
TIMES, Mar. 22, 2009, at A8 (“The Sudanese government has long suspected aid organizations of 
collaborating with the court by providing evidence and helping Prosecutors gather testimony from 
victims. But aid groups say that they have gone out of their way to avoid even the appearance of 
collaboration.”). 
 249. Id. 
 250. Situation in Darfur, Case No. ICC-02/05, Prosecutor’s Response to Cassese’s Observation on 
Issues Concerning the Protection of Victims and the Preservation of Evidence in the Proceedings on 
Darfur Pending before the ICC, ¶¶ 8, 11–17 (Sept. 11, 2006). 
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and intelligence sources to the defense or to international judges.251 
Indeed, as explained in Part II, NATO refused to cooperate with the ICTY, 
a refusal that led to the changes in the rules of the ICTY.  
At the ICC, issues pertaining to intelligence gathering are covered 
under Article 72 of the Rome Statute, which expressly deals with the 
protection of a state’s national security information.252 The four provisions 
of Article 72 give the OTP two options if a state is unwilling to share 
national security information with the Court.253 The first option, covering 
provisions one through three, allows the Court to modify the request for 
the information sought from a state.254 This option, however, does not deal 
with cases when exculpatory information that ought to be disclosed is 
among the original confidential, national security-sensitive evidence. 
The second option under Article 72, which covers instances when the 
OTP has been handed exculpatory information, calls for “[a]greement on 
conditions under which the assistance could be provided including . . . 
providing summaries or redactions, limitations on disclosure, use of in 
camera or ex parte proceedings, or other protective measures 
permissible . . . .” The text of this provision strongly resembles Rule 83.255 
It is thus reasonable to expect, by analogy to the holding of the Lubanga 
trial on Rule 83, that fairness concerns are again likely to push the ICC 
Chambers to allow summaries, redactions, or other limitations only after 
an in camera, ex parte proceeding over confidential information of 
national security. In reality, under Rule 72, the Lubanga precedent makes 
it very likely that the judges will seek to review exculpatory information 
that involves national security. 
In light of NATO’s historical reluctance to share any intelligence issues 
with the international judges, the possibility of judicial review makes it is 
very unlikely that NATO will provide any information to the ICC’s OTP. 
Perhaps, despite NATOs repeated calls for ICC involvement in Libya, it is 
for this reason that it has yet to mention the possibility of it cooperating 
with the ICC.256 Without any information from intelligence sources, the 
OTP may have a hard time building cases and obtaining convictions. 
 
 
 251. See, e.g., ICTY experience, supra Part II. 
 252. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 72. 
 253. Id.  
 254. ICC, Rules of Procedure and Evidence, supra note 15, Rule 72 (“(a) Modification or 
clarification of the request; (b) A determination by the Court regarding the relevance of the 
information or evidence sought, or a determination as to whether the evidence, though relevant, could 
be or has been obtained from a source other than the requested State; (c) Obtaining the information or 
evidence from a different source or in a different form.”). 
 255. Rome Statute, supra note 2, art. 83. 
 256. There is a clear lack of NATO press releases on this point. 
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Instead, the OTP will have to spend money and time collecting evidence 
from other sources (e.g., local media, NGOs, individuals). 
Overall, the rule requiring judicial involvement in determining the 
correct form of disclosure of confidential exculpatory evidence to the 
defense is likely to have a dampening effect on the information providers 
that collaborate with the OTP. NGOs operating in precarious conditions 
and states operating military and intelligence operations are unlikely to 
feel confident in the ability of judges at the ICC to safeguard their 
interests. As a result, they may refuse to cooperate with the ICC, leading 
an already overburdened OTP to stretch its sources even thinner. 
3. Disclosure Scheme Imposes Disproportionate Remedy on the OTP 
The second reason the present disclosure scheme risks diminishing the 
ability of the OTP to bring future cases is its failure to envision 
appropriate responses if some information providers do not consent to the 
present scheme of confidentiality.  
As outlined above (and in Part II), information providers may either 
refuse to lift their confidentiality or may disagree with the protective 
measures proposed by the ICC Chambers. Faced with a refusal, the OTP 
can either withdraw the charges that the exculpatory confidential 
information is relevant to or admit the underlying facts contained in the 
exculpatory confidential information.257 For example, in the Lubanga trial, 
had the UN not insisted that the judges not access information given to the 
OTP under the UN-ICC confidentiality agreement, the OTP would have 
been required to withdraw the charges or admit the underlying facts.258 For 
three reasons, this solution has the potential to decrease the OTP’s ability 
to bring future cases where the information provider refuses to cooperate. 
First, in many instances, such a remedy will be disproportionately 
excessive. For example, a single piece of exculpatory evidence, obtained 
under a confidentiality agreement with a third party information provider, 
may indicate that the accused had no direct knowledge that his militia was 
involved in rapes, killings, and food pillaging. If the information provider 
does not agree to the disclosure of this evidence, the OTP would be barred 
from seeking that the accused had direct knowledge of his militia’s actions 
of sexual violence, homicide, and destruction of property. But, what if the 
OTP has one hundred different pieces of evidence that indicate the 
 
 
 257. Schabas, supra note 22. 
 258. See supra Part II. 
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accused had direct knowledge? Withdrawal of the charges or admitting 
lack of direct knowledge appears to be an ill-suited remedy. 
Second, since the ICC routinely operates in harsh situations, the OTP 
may only be able to bring limited charges against the accused, tailored in 
particular to a fast and effective conviction. The present case against 
Lubanga illustrates this potential. Lubanga was charged only with the 
crime of enlisting child soldiers, despite his alleged greater involvement in 
other atrocities.259 In such cases, if the information provider does not 
cooperate, the OTP must weaken the case in favor of the single or few 
charges against the accused, by either withdrawing the charges or 
admitting the underlying facts. By weakening his own case due to the 
refusal of the information providers to lift confidentiality, the OTP would 
be less likely to meet its burden of proof, resulting in an acquittal or a 
conviction for a lesser crime. Both scenarios would result in a decrease of 
accountability. 
Finally, the present scheme fails to clarify to what extent the OTP must 
rectify its actions in case of non-cooperation by the information providers. 
After an information provider refuses to release its information to the 
judges, does the OTP have to throw away any information it obtained on 
the basis of the exculpatory evidence? If the ICC follows the “fruits of the 
poisonous tree” doctrine,260 it is likely that evidence obtained based on 
non-disclosed exculpatory evidence will also be tainted and thus 
inadmissible. Without such evidence, the OTP will have a harder time 
bringing forth cases. 
In order to protect the interests of the accused, the ICC Chambers make 
the case harder for the OTP. By insisting that the OTP withdraw the 
charges or admit the underlying facts, the Chambers place the OTP 
between a rock and a hard place—a position that is unwarranted given the 
reality that the information providers control the confidentiality. 
4. Conclusion 
Overall, the ICC Chambers decided to prioritize fairness in the 
Lubanga trial. They created a scheme in which the judges decide the 
manner of disclosing exculpatory information to the defense, and the OTP 
 
 
 259. Roman Graf, The International Criminal Court and Child Soldiers: An Appraisal of the 
Lubanga Judgment, 10 J. INT’L CRIM. JUSTICE 945 (2012), available at http://jicj.oxfordjournals.org/ 
content/early/2012/08/09/jicj.mqs044.full.pdf.  
 260. See, e.g., Robert M. Pitler, The Fruits of the Poisonous Tree Revised and Shepherdized, 56 
CALIF. L. REV. 579 (1968), available at http://scholarship.law.berkeley.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article 
=2807&context=californialawreview. 
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faces significant penalties even for failure to disclose. This scheme 
prioritizes the goal of a fair trial at the expense of future convictions. 
Indeed, the ability to target atrocity perpetrators may decrease as important 
information providers feel uncomfortable participating. The stringent 
consequences imposed on the OTP in cases where disclosure to the judges 
is impossible may also affect the ability to prosecute perpetrators of 
atrocities. 
B. Two Consequences of the Decision on Intermediaries 
For reasons similar to the use of third party information providers, the 
OTP is unlikely to stop using intermediaries. On the contrary, the greater 
the number of Situations under investigation, the more likely the OTP will 
resort to intermediaries, since its staff is limited. By mandating the 
disclosure of the intermediaries’ identities in cases where these they may 
have influenced witness testimony, the Chambers placed their fairness 
concerns ahead of the ICC’s concern for effective future OTPs. The two 
assumptions presented above,261 namely that the OTP does not have 
enough resources to investigate everything on its own and that there are 
good reasons for which it should trust locals or experts, are equally 
applicable in this section. This section will argue that the present decision 
to disclose the identity of intermediaries has no substantive impact on the 
trial phase of any case at the ICC. Furthermore, the disclosure of identities 
may, for two reasons, divert the ICC from its goal to decrease impunity. 
1. Disclosure will have a Negligible Substantive Impact at Trial 
While the use of intermediaries is a function of the reality of the 
Situations that the ICC has to investigate, the disclosure of their identities, 
for four reasons, will have a negligible impact on the trial phase of any 
case at the ICC.  
First, even without questions from the defense, the OTP has ample 
reasons to avoid intermediaries who will influence the evidence. Among 
others, honest intermediaries not only allow the OTP to build a solid case, 
but also put the OTP’s limited resources to their most effective use. In 
Lubanga, the Trial Chamber found the OTP “negligent” of its duties, but 
this reprimand has little coercive power in and of itself.262 On the contrary, 
the OTP in Lubanga always had a preference for honest intermediaries, 
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clearly exemplified by the OTP’s lengthy internal deliberations about the 
value of evidence collected by P-0316.263 Revealing the names of the 
intermediaries to the defense only slightly impedes the OTP’s case.  
Second, revealing the intermediaries’ identities to the defense had no 
discernible impact on the evaluation of the evidence at trial. The Trial 
Chamber is obligated to examine the testimony of all witnesses, regardless 
of how these became part of the case. In the final judgment of the Lubanga 
case, the Trial Chamber examined the reliability of every witness that 
became part of the OTP’s case through the use of an intermediary.264 This 
examination, however, had nothing particularly tailored to the role of the 
intermediary that linked the witness with the OTP, and it would (should) 
have happened even if the intermediary’s identity had not been disclosed. 
For example, after examining the testimony of witness P-0008, who had 
been introduced to the OTP by intermediary 143, the Trial Chamber 
determined that the witness’s account “viewed overall, is contradictory 
and implausible.”265 Conversely, for witness P-0038, “notwithstanding his 
connection to [intermediary] P-0316, the Chamber has concluded he was a 
reliable witness whose evidence is truthful and accurate.”266 The revelation 
of the identities of the intermediaries to the defense had no impact on these 
Chamber determinations. 
Third, the disclosure of the intermediaries’ identities to the defense 
teams should not be expected to further spur defense investigations. Even 
without the identity of the intermediaries, the defense teams would have 
tried to rebut the testimony of all witnesses offered by the OTP. The 
identity of the intermediaries is of limited use in that endeavor. For the 
defense, the identity of the witness is the sole important starting point. In 
the Lubanga trial, the defense team managed to discredit the OTP’s 
witnesses by presenting internal inconsistencies in their testimony and by 
bringing defense witnesses who had good knowledge of their true story.267 
To find these rebuttal witnesses, the defense team only needed to know the 
identity of the individual witnesses, not of the involved intermediary. 
Finally, the defense demanded to know the identity of the 
intermediaries in order to prove that they had improperly influenced the 
OTP’s witnesses.268 However, such improper influence could have been 
 
 
 263. Id. ¶ 315. 
 264. See supra Part III. 
 265. Final Judgment, ¶ 232. 
 266. Id. ¶ 348. 
 267. See, e.g., Final Judgment, ¶ 281 ([T]o rebut witness P-0011, the Defense called witness D-
0024, “a member of P-0011’s family.”).  
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established through the use of the diagrams, which linked every 
intermediary to all the witnesses it produced for the OTP. The OTP 
provided such diagrams to the Chambers and the defense teams early in 
the trial.269 By examining witnesses in an organized fashion, the defense 
could have shown the improper role of the intermediaries just as well as it 
did after it was aware of the latter’s identities. Indeed, the defense did this 
with intermediary 143 even before it knew of its identity.270 
2. Disclosure to Impede Bringing Future Cases 
Even though the above arguments illustrate that the disclosure of the 
identity of the intermediaries does not help the Trial Chamber’s 
determinations, the work of the OTP, or the defense teams in any 
meaningful way, this disclosure may impede the ICC’s greater goal of 
ending impunity when conducting atrocity trials. 
Most obviously, the threat that the name of an intermediary may be 
revealed may have a chilling effect on the willingness of intermediaries to 
participate in the OTP’s investigations. As the present case indicates, the 
intermediaries used by the ICC are usually people aware of the ICC’s 
activities.271 After ICC personnel arrived in the DRC, intermediaries who 
worked for local organizations and were aware of the details of the ICC 
investigation often approached the OTP to volunteer assistance.272 Such 
individuals were the most helpful for the OTP’s investigative work, as 
they had direct knowledge of the local conditions and were also aware of 
the nature of the ICC’s works.273 After the events of the Lubanga case, 
such individuals have been placed on notice that their identities will be 
disclosed to the defense team upon allegations against their work. It is 
reasonable to assume that these individuals are aware of this risk, as they 
follow the developments of the ICC.274 
In countries with rampant militia activities, where the OTP needs 
intermediaries the most, people are less likely to risk having their name 
revealed to the defense team. This deterrent effect, unfortunately, has 
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already proven true. In the Katanga case, Trial Chamber II found that real 
threats hung over an intermediary who had been named by a witness at 
trial.275 Due to the influence of the accused Ngudjolo’s supporters in the 
DRC, a similar situation occurred, threatening the life and security of 
translators, witnesses, and their families.276 The present of such tangible 
threats may impede certain individuals from cooperating with the 
investigations, thereby decreasing the quality or increasing the costs of the 
investigations. Such possibilities also diminish the likelihood of the 
investigation’s success. 
Moreover, the revelation of an intermediary’s name is likely to have a 
negative effect on the OTP’s ongoing investigations. For example, when 
the OTP started its investigations in the DRC, intermediaries helped it 
build cases against Lubanga, but also against Katanga and Ngudjolo, and 
Bosco Ntaganda.277 By revealing the name of an intermediary to the 
Lubanga defense team, the OTP’s investigative efforts in the other cases 
stemming out of the DRC may be implicated. For example, intermediary 
143, found to be unreliable in the Lubanga final judgment, was also used 
as an intermediary in the Katanga/Ngudjolo case.278 In earlier stages of the 
Lubanga and Katanga/Ngudjolo cases, Trial Chambers I and II, 
appreciating the difficulties resulting from this practical overlap and the 
defense’s incentive to engage in cross-cutting requests,279 decided to defer 
to the first protective measures in place.280 For intermediary 143, however, 
that initial protective measure was overturned later in the Lubanga case, 
and his identity was eventually revealed to the defense.281 Is it realistic to 
expect that intermediary 143 can still work in the DRC for the OTP in the 
effort to bring the Katanga/Ngudjolo and other cases? 
Despite the Chamber’s laudable effort to protect intermediaries across 
multiple cases, the possibility that an intermediary may have his identity 
 
 
 275. The Prosecutor v. Germain Katanga and Matthew Ngudjolo Chui, ICC-01/04-01/07-888-
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revealed can cause considerable difficulties for the OTP. Admittedly, it 
may be good that the OTP stops using intermediaries that have affected 
the credibility of his witnesses. But, the quality of the intermediary is 
currently only judged by a Trial Chamber after the revelation of the 
intermediaries’ identity to the defense.282 In reality, as evidenced by the 
case of P-0031,283 some intermediaries will have their cover blown and yet 
be found reliable and trustworthy. In such cases, revealing their identities 
to the defense teams would warrant great concern and trouble for the OTP, 
as it effectively impedes its other investigations. 
3. Conclusion 
The ICC’s decision to disclose the identity of intermediaries aimed to 
promote fairness in the Lubanga trial. Nevertheless, it is not clear that 
revealing intermediaries made any substantive difference to the defense’s 
strategy. Such revelations, however, will possibly dissuade potential 
intermediaries from working for the OTP and stigmatize the current 
intermediaries, leading them to stay out of ongoing or future 
investigations. By insisting on the fair trial rights of the accused, the Trial 
Chamber sacrificed the possibility of easier future investigations. 
V. CONCLUSION 
The Lubanga trial was a watershed moment for international criminal 
law—the culmination of six months of important developments in the 
field.284 After many years of planning and ten years of preparation,285 an 
ICC Trial Chamber handed down its first judgment. Admittedly, since this 
is the first judgment of this Court it will—and should—be scrutinized. 
This article has examined how the ICC dealt with two types of disclosure: 
exculpatory confidential evidence the identities of the intermediaries. In 
doing so, it aimed to convey the complete record of the events at issue, 
and through these, to illustrate the complexity of such matters. 
Additionally, this questions the wisdom of these decisions for the long-
term viability of international criminal investigations at the ICC. 
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The Lubanga judgment inaugurated the adolescent period for the field 
of international criminal law. Yet, as the above skepticism indicates, the 
ICC’s decisions on evidence have placed considerable impediments in the 
path of future cases. Like all adolescents, international criminal justice 
seems to be undergoing a period of rapid and unpredictable 
transformation. This internal upheaval is primarily caused the Chamber’s 
decision to prioritize the accused’s rights without considering the greater 
institutional balance. Perhaps the future will see this equilibrium 
recalibrated. 
It is also possible, however, that the future of international criminal 
justice will retain this imbalance. So far, through the ad hoc tribunals, 
international criminal law has played a primary role in post-atrocity 
criminal justice.286 Breaking from this tradition, the ICC was designed to 
be a court of last resort.287 In maintaining an evidentiary balance in favor 
of the accused, and thus making it difficult for the OTP to bring forth 
cases, the ICC judges may be signaling their understanding of this last-
resort role.288 Trials at the ICC may simply be hard to bring by design. In 
such an environment, the future of international criminal law may depend 
more on the development of local legal capacity than on successful trials at 
the ICC. In this regard, the world of international criminal justice remains 
somewhat infantile, attempting to balance on its two baby legs, while its 
parents wait to see how tall it will grow. 
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